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SPEECH, INTENT, AND THE PRESIDENT
Katherine Shawt
Judicial inquiries into official intent are a familiar feature
of the legal landscape. Across various bodies of constitutional
and public law-from equal protection and due process to the
First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,
from the Eighth Amendment to the Dormant Commerce
Clause, and in statutory interpretation and administrative law
cases across a range of domains-assessments of the intent
of government actors are ubiquitous in our law.
But whose intent matters to courts evaluating the meaning
or lawfulness of government action? When it comes to stat-
utes, forests have been felled debating the place of legislative
intent. But, although the government conduct subject to chal-
lenge is frequently action by executive-branch officials, no co-
herent body of work attends in the same way to the role of
intent and the executive-either its function across bodies of
law, or the means by which it is established.
The novel rhetorical habits and strategies of President
Donald Trump have already thrust questions of presidential
intent into the spotlight in high-stakes recent and ongoing liti-
gation. Both the Supreme Court and lower courts have strug-
gled in these cases, with no real guiding principles regarding
the significance of presidential statements, their relationship
to presidential intent, or the relevance of intent in challenges to
presidential action. These cases highlight the absence of any
coherent conceptual framework for assessing the speech and
intent of the President. This Article attempts to fill that gap.
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Two and a half years into the administration of Donald
Trump, novel questions about the relationship between law,
rhetoric, and executive power seem to arise almost daily. The
President has reshaped the nature of presidential communica-
tion in ways that will reverberate for years to come. But
whatever those long-term consequences for the presidency, the
polity, or the constitutional order more broadly, one institution
tasked with responding in the short term is the judiciary.
One particularly pressing set of questions facing the courts
involves presidential speech, presidential intent, and the bear-
ing of both on the meaning or lawfulness of presidential action.
These questions have been thrust into the national spotlight in
high-stakes litigation, including over the President's "travel
[Vol. 104:13371338
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ban" directives.' Courts evaluating the lawfulness of those or-
ders have wrestled with what weight to accord the President's
statements, both from the campaign and following inaugura-
tion, with very little guidance regarding the interpretive signifi-
cance of those words, or their relationship to presidential
intent or to the President's constitutional or statutory author-
ity. As the travel ban cases-and several others ongoing at the
time of this writing2-make clear, courts for the most part lack
any coherent interpretive framework for evaluating either
speech or intent when it comes to the President. This piece,
following previous work that focused on presidential speech
more broadly,3 attempts to fill that gap.
Although President Trump's novel rhetorical strategies
have opened up a host of new questions regarding intent and
the President, there is substantial existing law on the broader
question of official intent and government actors.4 Indeed, ju-
dicial inquiries into government intent or purpose are ubiqui-
tous in constitutional and public law.
First, a sophisticated body of literature and doctrine grap-
ples with purpose and intent in statutory interpretation, focus-
ing in particular on whether and how courts should consider
extrinsic sources in construing ambiguous statutory terms.
5
But this work remains focused on legislative intent; no analo-
gous body of work attends to purpose and intent in the context
of the executive, particularly where the government action in
1 See Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, Proclama-
tion No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Proclamation No.
96451; Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter E.O.
13,780]; Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter E.O.
13,769].
2 This includes, among other things, the litigation over the President's so-
called "sanctuary cities" executive order, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of
the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017)
[hereinafter E.O. 13,768]; see Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497
(N.D. Cal. 2017), as well as the rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) program. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018) affd, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018),
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209
(D.D.C 2018), cert. beforejudgment granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019); Batalla Vidal
v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2017), cert. beforejudgment granted sub.
nora. McAleenan v. Vidal, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019).
3 See Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the
Courts, 96 TEx. L. REv. 71 (2017) (arguing that courts should give legal effect to
only certain presidential statements).
4 See id. at 99-115.
5 See infra Part I.
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question comes in the form of directives issued by the President
or other executive-branch actors.
At the same time, intent requirements are a familiar fea-
ture of the constitutional landscape. Across various bodies of
doctrine-from equal protection and due process to the First
Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, from
the Eighth Amendment to the Dormant Commerce Clause-
judicially crafted tests direct courts to probe the purpose or
intent of government actors.6 Although courts generally frame
these tests with reference to statutes and decision-making bod-
ies, rather than executive-branch players and executive action,
a close look at the case law reveals that in all of these substan-
tive constitutional-law domains, the relevant government ac-
tors can be legislative or executive.7 Executive intent, then, is
very much present (if conceptually underdeveloped) in consti-
tutional adjudication. And a number of administrative-law
cases attend to the intent of subordinate actors within the
executive branch, but without connecting their intent inquiries
to the larger body of constitutional law on official intent, and
often without articulating the constitutional values advanced
by scrutinizing agency action to ascertain impermissible
intent.
When the President takes some action, then, or issues a
legal directive, there is surprisingly little direct authority on the
relevance of purpose or intent, or the means by which those
might be established, either for courts evaluating the consis-
tency of that action or directive with the requirements of the
Constitution, or when it comes to the task of ordinary
interpretation.
Three examples, two real and the third a stylized version of
actual events, help illustrate the types of disputes that impli-
cate the questions at the heart of this Article. I introduce them
briefly here and return to them in Part III.
As a candidate, the President repeatedly promises to
implement a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims
entering the United States."8 One week after his inaugu-
6 See infra Part I.
7 Indeed, under some circumstances, the actors may be functioning as adju-
dicators, as in the Court's recent decision in Masterpiece Bakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1730 (2018) (highlighting statements by
members of "an adjudicatory body deciding a particular case").
8 7ump Calls for Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the
U.S.', NBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/video/trump-calls-
for-total-and- complete- shutdown-of-muslims-entering-the-u-s- 581768771855
[https: //perma.cc/VND2-EH2L].
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ration, he issues an executive order imposing a ninety-day
ban on entry into the United States by individuals from
seven Muslim-majority countries.9 The order is chal-
lenged immediately in a number of venues, and courts
quickly face questions regarding the order's scope, opera-
tion, and constitutionality. 10
Both during the presidential campaign and in the early
days of the new administration, the President repeatedly
criticizes what he describes as "sanctuary cities."11
Within days of taking office, the President issues an Exec-
utive Order that purports to "[elnsure that jurisdictions
that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do not
receive Federal funds. . ".."12 At a press conference an-
nouncing the new order, the White House Press Secretary
explains it this way: "We are going to strip federal grant
money from the sanctuary states and cities that harbor
illegal immigrants. The American people are no longer
going to have to be forced to subsidize this disregard for
our laws."13 Several cities challenge the order, and courts
must both construe the order and determine whether it is
constitutional. 14
" Six months into the new administration, the President
announces in a series of tweets that transgender individu-
9 E.O. 13,769, supra note 1. For later Iterations of this order, see Enhancing
Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United
States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, Proclamation No. 9645, supra
note 1; Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,
E.O. 13,780, supra note 1.
10 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F. 3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied sub nom. Golden v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 448 (2017).
11 See Matthew Boyle, Donald J. Trump to San Francisco: Sanctuary Cities




ary cities are a disaster .... We'll be looking at sanctuary cities very hard.");
Interview by Bill O'Reilly with Donald J. Trump, President of the United States,
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/in
dex.php?pid= 123062 [https://perma.cc/Y5TH-DLWD] ("I'm very much opposed
to sanctuary cities. They breed crime, there's a lot of problems. If we have to, we'll
defund. We give tremendous amounts of money to California-California In many
ways is out of control . . ").
12 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, E.O. 13,768,
supra note 2.
13 TheWhite House, 1/25/17: White House Press Briefing, YoUTUBE (Jan. 25,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OaPriMVvtZA [https://perma.cc/
2JBP-8U83].
14 See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal.




als will no longer be allowed to serve in the U.S. military. 15
He follows that announcement with a Presidential Memo-
randum that directs the Secretaries of Defense and Home-
land Security to create a process for ending the accession
of transgender individuals into the military. 16 A number
of individuals challenge both the order and its implemen-
tation, and the courts must both interpret the order and
decide whether it complies with the Constitution. 17
Each of these cases presents both (1) interpretive ques-
tions regarding the meaning or effect of a presidential directive,
and (2) constitutional questions regarding the substantive per-
missibility of that same directive. And, in each case, state-
ments by the President and other executive-branch officials
might bear on intent in both of those endeavors.
This Article begins with a (necessarily abbreviated) tour
through some key debates in statutory interpretation, in par-
ticular regarding legislative purpose, legislative intent, and reli-
ance on extrinsic evidence like legislative history. It then turns
to the parallel and largely separate body of law that grapples
with these concepts in the context of constitutional claims.
The Article then turns to the executive, asking how courts
apply intent-based tests in constitutional cases involving the
executive, and arguing that for the most part courts make no
distinction between legislative and executive-branch officials in
such cases. It then explores the function of intent in adminis-
trative law, with reference to several lines of important admin-
istrative-law cases that highlight the significance of official
intent (in contrast to much of administrative law's decentering
of intent).
Turning more fully to the normative, the Article unfolds an
argument that, taken together, these materials suggest that
judicial reliance on the intent of executive-branch officials in
constitutional and "constitutionally inflected" cases, even if un-
derdeveloped, is actually routine, appropriate, and well-
grounded in a familiar conceptual apparatus. Beyond consti-
15 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWflTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM),
https: //twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864 [https://
perma.cc/RDP-DXVN; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TITrER (July 26,
2017, 6:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/8901961643138
33472 [https://perma.cc/HB8H-XDZ6]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:08 AM) https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
890197095151546369 [https://perma.cc/52YQ-DDN5].
16 Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 82 Fed. Reg.
41,319 (Aug. 25, 2017).
17 See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Trump, 275F. Supp. 3d 167, 211 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding
that transgender individuals were likely to prevail on an equal protection claim).
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tutional doctrine, there is significant authority from federal ad-
ministrative law that both supports the propriety of such
inquiries and provides guidelines for conducting them. In light
of this background, I argue, it is appropriate and often neces-
sary for courts to consider presidential intent in cases involving
constitutional challenges to presidential action. But I also ar-
gue that for a number of institutional reasons, courts should
proceed with caution before employing a concept of "presiden-
tial intent" that tracks the idea of "legislative intent" when it
comes to the task of ordinary interpretation of presidential di-
rectives. The concepts of legislative intent and legislative his-
tory, developed and debated in the context of statutes, are a
poor fit in the context of executive action. The Article thus
provides a set of guidelines, with specific reference to the exam-
ples above as well as a handful of others, for distinguishing
between proper and improper judicial invocation of presidential
intent. 18
Several caveats are in order before proceeding further.
First, this Article focuses on judicial approaches to both the
speech and the intent of the President. It does not examine the
treatment of presidential statements, or the role of presidential
intent more broadly, inside the executive branch, as agencies
endeavor to carry out presidential directives and policy goals.
That is a worthy subject and one I hope to pursue in future
work, but it is not this project. Similarly, intriguing authority
from some state courts grapples with the intent and speech of
state executive-branch officials, primarily governors and attor-
neys general. Many of the same questions pursued in this
Article arise in analogous ways in the context of the states,
19
but I do not attempt to address those questions here.
The scenarios described above raise questions regarding
the relevance of speech by the President not only while in office
but also in the context of political campaigns. Once again, this
is an important question, and one scholarship is beginning to
18 Although all of these examples involve legal challenges to policy initiatives
of the Trump administration, it is my hope that the analysis and proposals I offer
here are durable enough to transcend this particular administration. For an
argument that the presidency of Donald Trump requires jettisoning "rules of
constitutional practice and constitutional interpretation rooted in assumptions
that constitutional institutions are functioning normally," see Sanford Levinson &
Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitu-
tional Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAPMAN L. REV. 133, 164
(2018).
19 See Katherine Shaw, The State Bully Pulpit (working draft).
13432019l
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
take up,20 but I do not directly tackle the question here, focus-
ing instead on what I believe are important antecedent
questions.
Similarly, presidential statements could prove relevant to
investigations involving the President, whether by executive-
branch21 or congressional actors; but the relevance of state-
ments in any such proceedings is similarly distinct from my
focus here.
22
One final introductory note. As the foregoing makes clear,
courts and commentators use the term "intent" in a number of
distinct ways. The term is used, first, to describe a state of
mind, in particular in the context of impermissible motives like
bias or animus.23 It is also used in the more value-neutral
sense of attempted communicative content or meaning,24 as
well as to describe the expected or predicted results of a partic-
ular course of action (put differently, a tort-like concept of "the
natural and foreseeable consequences of [an] act."25 ). Identify-
ing these tensions and sensitive to these distinctions, this piece
attempts to offer a descriptive account and a set of recommen-
dations for distinguishing proper from improper judicial use of
presidential intent, with particular reference to the role of ex-
trinsic materials in cases involving intent. But the topic is vast,
20 See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Campaign Communications and the Problem of
Government Motive, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 333 (2018); Shawn E. Fields, Is ItBad
Law to Believe a Politician? Campaign Speech and Discriminatory Intent, 52 U.
RICH. L. REv. 273 (2018) (discussing whether courts should consider campaign
statements as evidence of discriminatory motive).
21 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFER-
ENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1, https://www.justice.gov/storage/re
port.pdf Ihttps://perma.cc/8CY8-PJWG].
22 Cf. Kate Shaw, Impeachment and Presidential Rhetoric, TAKE CARE BLOG
(June 14, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/impeachment-and-presidential-
rhetoric [https://perma.cc/LUD4-ZGY7] (discussing role of presidential rhetoric
in previous impeachment efforts).
23 See WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 5
(2017).
24 See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479 (2013).
25 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATIONS: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 131 (4th ed., 2011); see
also Micah Schwartzman, Official Intentions and Political Legitimacy: The Case of
the Travel Ban, in NOMOS LXI: POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 205 (Jack Knight & Melissa
Schwartzberg eds., 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159393 [https://perma
.cc/CJF4-KYWS] (defining "intention" as "the reasons for which agents under-
stand themselves to be acting," and declining to distinguish between intentions
and motivations) Aziz Z. Huq, What is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
1211, 1215 (2018) ("[The federal judiciary has not homed in upon a single defini-
tion of discriminatory intent.").
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and this piece offers more the beginning of a dialogue than a
comprehensive set of answers.
26
I
LEGISLATIVE INTENT: DOCTRINE AND DEBATES
While questions of presidential intent have remained re-
markably underexplored, a rich body of both doctrine and
scholarship grapples with the role of intent in the interpreta-
tion of statutes, focusing in particular on whether and how
courts should consider extrinsic sources of evidence as part of
the interpretive endeavor. Accordingly, before turning directly
to presidential speech and presidential intent, I take a brief
tour through some key debates in statutory interpretation.
A. Legislative Intent in Ordinary Interpretation
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks once famously observed that
"[t]he hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no
intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory
of statutory interpretation."27 That observation remains largely
true today: judges and scholars remain sharply divided on the
proper approach to statutory interpretation, on grounds both
theoretical and methodological.
28
Still, commentators of all stripes tend to agree that "gen-
eral statutory language inescapably includes open spaces and
unresolved questions of meaning."29 The key question in stat-
utory interpretation, then, is how to fill those spaces and an-
swer those questions. Contemporary approaches can be
roughly divided into two general camps, at least for purposes of
this project: variants of purposivism or intentionalism, on the
one hand, and textualism, on the other.30
26 The philosophical literature on the nature of intention is, of course, exten-
sive, but mostly beyond the scope of this piece. Important works include T.M.
Scanlon, Intention and Permissibility, 74 ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 301 (2000); MICHAEL E.
BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION (1999); G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (1957).
27 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frlckey eds., 1994).
28 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 9 (2012) ("Is it an exaggeration to say that the field of interpretation is
rife with confusion? No.").
29 See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM.
L. REv. 673, 695 (1997); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Struc-
ture in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 67 (1994) ("'Plain
meaning' as a way to understand language is silly. In interesting cases, meaning
is not 'plain.'").
30 In identifying these as the most important approaches to statutory inter-
pretation, I largely omit consideration of positive political theory, contract theo-
2019l 1345
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As a general matter, purposivists tend to construe statutes
"in relation to broad purposes that they derive not only from
the text simpliciter, but also from an understanding [ofl what
social problems the legislature was addressing and what gen-
eral ends it was seeking."3 1 As Hart and Sacks explained, a
court should interpret a statute "to carry out the purpose as
best it can" 3 2 ; operationally, this means that courts should
"[diecide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and
to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved[,] and
then [i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in ques-
tion so as to carry out the purpose as best it can."
33
Purposivists' close cousins, intentionalists, "concern them-
selves more directly [than purposivists] with actual, historical
understandings of statutes that can be ascribed to the mem-
bers of the legislature. " 3 4 Discussions of legislative intent often
encompass at least two distinct concepts: first, what did the
drafters of a piece of legislation mean to accomplish through a
particular enactment? Second, why did the drafters act as they
did?3 5 Under the rubrics of both purposivism and intentional-
ism, courts regularly consult materials outside of the statutory
text. These include the social and historical context and, most
controversially, legislative history-principally committee re-
ports and statements by key players involved in the passage of
a particular piece of legislation.
By contrast, textualists hold that "statutory meaning is to
be found in the words the legislature has used."3 6 As leading
ries, pragmatism, and self-consciously "dynamic" theories of statutory
interpretation. All of those approaches are clearly important; but they are less
fixated on extrinsic materials than are purposivism, ntentionalism, and textual-
ism. Because the proper role of extrinsic materials is a key focus of my project,
my discussion is limited to the schools of thought that similarly engage with these
sources.
31 Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 225,
227 (1999); see Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualisrn, 119 YALE L.J.
1750, 1764 (2010) ("Purposivists' salient difference from textualists is their focus
on 'interpret[ing] the words of the statute... so as to carry out the purpose as best
[they] can' and their willingness to consider an array of extrinsic interpretive aids,
including legislative history, to do so." (footnote omitted)); see also ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 31 (2014) ("Statutes... have purposes or objectives
that are discernible. The task of the judge is to make sense of legislation in a way
that is faithful to Congress's purposes.").
32 HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1374.
33 Id.
34 Strauss, supra note 31, at 227.
35 Cf. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1090 (2017) (distinguishing between "author's intent and
reader's understanding" as theories of meaning).
36 Strauss, supra, note 31, at 227.
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textualists Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner summarized their
basic view in 2012: 'Textualism... begins and ends with what
the text says and fairly implies." 37 In the words of Dean John
Manning, "textualists choose the letter of the statutory text
over its spirit[,]" 38 and in Professor Bill Eskridge's gloss, for
textualists, "a statutory text's apparent plain meaning must be
the alpha and the omega in a judge's interpretation of the stat-
ute."39 When it comes to translating these commitments to
praxis, Scalia and Garner suggest hat judges should "look for
meaning in the governing text, ascribe to that text the meaning
that it has borne from its inception, and reject judicial specula-
tion about both the drafters' extratextually derived purposes
and the desirability of the fair reading's anticipated conse-
quences."40 If the text alone fails to resolve questions of mean-
ing, most textualists allow the use of a number of canons of
interpretation, both textual and substantive.
So while both purposivists and intentionalists believe that
the interpretive endeavor often requires looking beyond or be-
hind statutory language, including considering the articulated
goals of drafters and other participants in the legislative pro-
cess, most textualists disavow the relevance, or even any stable
concept, of intent in statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia
and Bryan Garner suggest that "it is high time that further
uses of intent in questions of legal interpretation be
abandoned."
4 1
The textualist critique of the quest for intent or purpose
tends to come in several different forms.4 2 First, textualists
challenge the idea that intent can be discerned at all in the
context of a multimember body like a legislature, where com-
37 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 16; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1511 (1998) (describing
Justice Scalia's textualism).
38 John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419,
420 (2005).
39 Eskridge, supra note 37.
40 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at xxvii.
41 Id. at 396; see also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S.
81, 119 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("To be governed by legislated text rather
than legislators' intentions is what it means to be 'a Government of laws, not of
men.'"); Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 68 ("Intent is empty. Peer inside the heads
of legislators and you find a hodgepodge. Some strive to serve the public interest
.... Some strive for re-election .... Most do a little of each.... Intent is elusive
for a natural person, fictive for a collective body.").
42 As in the case of the constitutional questions discussed in the next sub-
Part, questions of legislative purpose or intent involve two distinct (though re-
lated) lines of inquiry-the relevance vel non of "legislative intent" and the means
by which it is established.
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promise is required and intentions may be inconsistent or con-
flicting. 43 This argument is by no means a new one. Max Radin
wrote in 1930 that "[t]he chances that of several hundred men
each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind
... are infinitesimally small,"44 and many esteemed thinkers
since-both inside and outside of the legal academy-have
echoed or offered variations on this critique.
45
Purposivists and intentionalists do not accept these criti-
cisms, of course. Judge Robert Katzmann, for example, a lead-
ing proponent of purposivism, writes:
That legislation is the institutional product of a collection of
individuals with a variety of motives and perspectives should
not foreclose the effort to discern purposes. Just as inten-
tions are attributed to other large entities-such as local gov-
ernments, trade associations, and businesses-so too do
linguistic protocols, everyday mores, and context facilitate an
inquiry into what Congress intended to do when statutory
text is vague or ambiguous.
46
Professor Victoria Nourse echoes this response, invoking math-
ematician Alan Turing: "[The question is not whether com-
puters or groups have minds but how groups and computers
act."
4 7
Textualists also argue that the key materials from which
intent would even be divined-primarily legislative history-
are categorically improper interpretive tools,
4 8 both unreliable
43 Gluck, supra note 31, at 1762; Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They,"
Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239
(1992); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347, 372 (2005); John F.
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7 (2001);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2043 (2006)
(reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006)).
44 Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
45 See RONALD DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 335-36 (1986); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW
AND DISAGREEMENT 128 (1999); Shepsle, supra note 43, at 249-50; VICTORIA
NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 138-44 (2016) (describing the
critique).
46 KATZMANN, supra note 31, at 34-35; see also MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF
INTENTION 143 (1999) ("Shared intentions are intentions of the group.... [W]hat
they consist in is a public, interlocking web of the intentions of the individuals.").
47 NOURSE, supra note 45, at 146 (emphasis added).
48 See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 37, at 1512 ("[Tihe new textualism's most
distinctive feature is its insistence that judges should almost never consult, and
never rely on, the legislative history of a statute."); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations
About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 377 ("It is well known
that technocrats, lobbyists and attorneys have created a virtual cottage industry
in fashioning legislative history so that the Congress will appear to embrace their
particular view in a given statute."). But see In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340,
1341-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing distinctions between different uses of legisla-
tive history).
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and susceptible to manipulation.49 Beyond these pragmatic
objections to the use of legislative history, many textualists
argue that reliance on legislative history is inconsistent with or
undermines the constitutionally prescribed process for passing
legislation-bicameralism and presentment.50 What results
from that process is law, the argument runs; for courts to place
decisive (or perhaps even significant) weight on anything else is
in tension with that process, if not flagrantly unconstitu-
tional.5 1 Some textualists also contend that the use of legisla-
tive history represents an unconstitutional delegation-that is,
that such reliance runs afoul of "the prohibition against legisla-
tive self-delegation,"52 because it is tantamount to a delegation
of "legislative power" to either committees or individual mem-
bers. Purposivists and intentionalists respond that their use of
legislative history merely facilitates the proper understanding
of, rather than displaces, statutory text, so that none of these
constitutional arguments has any genuine force.
Finally, textualists often argue that limiting judges to stat-
utory text, together with a specified group of extrinsic sources
that does not include legislative history,53 will better cabin ju-
dicial discretion than approaches like intentionalism and
purposivism. Opponents counter that textualists have it pre-
cisely backward: by seeking evidence of legislative purpose,
judges faithfully interpret the handiwork of the legislature
rather than imposing their own preferences, and that it is tex-
49 See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("It is neither compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned,
consistent, and effective application of the statutes of the United States, nor
conducive to a genuine effectuation of congressional intent, to give legislative force
to each snippet of analysis, and even every case citation, in committee reports
that are increasingly unreliable evidence of what the voting Members of Congress
actually had in mind.").
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3.
51 See Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264,
279-80 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original
Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 59, 64 (1988) ("If we
took an opinion poll of Congress today on a raft of issues and found out its views,
would those views become the law? Certainly not. They must run the gamut of
the process-and process is the essence of legislation." (footnote omitted)); Man-
ning, supra note 29, at 697 ("Neither committee reports nor sponsors' statements
comply with the 'fairly precise' requirements set by the Constitution for the enact-
ment of legislation. And so a court cannot treat those materials as authoritative
sources of statutory meaning without offending the bicameralism and present-
ment requirements . . ").
52 Manning, supra note 29, at 675.
53 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI.
L. REv. 825, 836-39 (2017); Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560,
566-70 (2012) (relying heavily on a number of dictionaries).
20191 1349
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tualism that does not deliver on its promise to meaningfully
constrain judicial discretion. 
54
Critics of the quest for intent in the interpretation of stat-
utes have a recent and unexpected ally of sorts in Professor
Victoria Nourse. Professor Nourse, though herself no textualist,
has recently advocated a conceptual and rhetorical shift from
the concept of legislative intent-which she describes as "the
most confusing idea in all statutory interpretation theory"
5 5-
and toward the less freighted and more descriptively accurate
idea of legislative context. As she explains, reliance on outside
materials in the attempt to divine the meaning of a legislative
enactment is not the pursuit of "some ghostly spirit"; rather, it
is a search for context as a guide to meaning, something legis-
lative evidence (she prefers the term to legislative history) is
uniquely able to supply.5 6 She argues that much reliance on
legislative history fails to understand it in its full context-she
analogizes reliance on the "wrong" types of legislative evidence
to a legal briefs reliance on a dissenting rather than majority
opinion-and contends that greater attention to legislative
rules and processes will equip courts to infer group intent from
group action. And, she argues, a move away from mental
states toward a focus on action will allow us to transcend
spurious "group intent" objections and to actually grasp "the
meaning of public acts done according to the rules"57-a prag-
matic conception of intent that focuses on action.
58
54 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 855-56 (1992); James J. Brudney & Corey
Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (challenging "formalist claims that the canons can
promote either impartiality or consistency in judicial reasoning"); Miranda Mc-
Gowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia's
Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 143
(2008).
55 NOURSE, supra note 45, at 135.
56 Id. at 135-37 ("My argument does not reject the notion of intent. Instead, I
redefine it as a search for public legislative context.").
57 Id. at 150.
58 Id. at 142-43 ("Philosophical pragmatism takes the view that one cannot
know one's ends without acting to achieve those ends .... Because pragmatic
intent focuses on action, it does not require a mental state or a communication;
for that reason it emphasizes and requires an understanding of context from
which to infer meaning." (emphasis omitted)). But see Ryan D. Doerfler, Who
Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DuKE L.J. 979, 1044 (2017) (questioning
the value of "[attention to the nuances of the legislative process" in statutory
interpretation).
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B. Constitutionally Suspect Legislative Intent
The debates above primarily concern ordinary interpreta-
tion-that is, how courts should determine what a statute
means or does. But a parallel and largely separate body of law,
typically under the rubric of constitutional law rather than
statutory interpretation, asks whether legislation is tainted by
some form of constitutionally impermissible intent.59 Of
course, this is a somewhat artificial separation: courts often
inquire into legislative purpose or intent precisely in order to
determine whether illegitimate purpose renders a particular
enactment unconstitutional. But the constitutional doctrine
has developed on a largely separate path, giving rise to a num-
ber of distinct doctrinal tests across a range of silos of constitu-
tional law; what unites these tests is that all direct courts to
probe the intent or purpose of legislators when evaluating the
constitutionality of a particular legislative enactment.
First, and perhaps most familiar, is equal protection,
where the Court has rejected effects tests in favor of a require-
ment of discriminatory intent.60 In the context of race61 and
sex62-and to varying degrees alienage, national origin, and
parentage-the Court has looked to purpose in adjudicating
equal protection claims challenging conduct ranging from dis-
crimination in employment63 to felon disenfranchisement,64 re-
59 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution 81 (2001)
("[Clontemporary constitutional doctrine reflects a larger concern with the legiti-
macy of governmental purposes than is often appreciated.").
60 See id. at 90 (noting that the Court has "expressly rejected arguments in
favor of effects and balancing tests and made discriminatory purpose the touch-
stone of equal protection inquiries").
61 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[Olur cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional .... ).
62 See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (in the
context of sex discrimination claims under the Constitution, "purposeful discrimi-
nation is 'the condition that offends the Constitution'" (quoting Swann v. Char-
Iotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971))).
63 See Guardians Ass'n of N.Y.C. Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of
City of New York, 633 F.2d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1980), affld, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)
("[Tihe constitutional standard is concerned only with action reflecting a racially
discriminatory purpose .... ."); Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 899 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("Discriminatory intent must be shown in fourteenth-amendment ac-
tions against government agencies.").
64 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (striking down Ala-
bama's felon disenfranchisement constitutional provision on the grounds that "its
original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on
account of race and the section continues to this day to have that effect").
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districting,6 5 and jury selection.6 6 The Court has also inquired
into purpose in cases involving claims of discrimination that
targets groups not specifically designated as "suspect classes,"
including individuals with intellectual disabilities;67 gays and
lesbians;68 even particular individuals singled out by govern-
ment bodies for adverse treatment69 (so-called equal protection
"class of one" claims).
Equally common are discussions of purpose in cases in-
volving religious discrimination under the First Amendment.
When it comes to the Establishment Clause, the Court has
underscored "the intuitive importance of official purpose to the
realization of Establishment Clause values,"70 and has de-
65 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (sustaining challenge to "re-
districting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can
be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting") (empha-
sis added); cf. Justin Levitt, Intent is Enough: Invidious Partisanship in Redistrict-
ing, 59 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1993, 1998-2002 (2018) (explaining the way courts
have considered intent in challenges to partisan gerrymanders under the Equal
Protection Clause).
66 See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) ("[The Constitution
forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.")
(quoting United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994)).
67 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450
(1985) (finding that the application of a zoning ordinance was based on "irrational
prejudice" against individuals with disabilities).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774, (2013) ("[The prin-
cipal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons
who are in a lawful same-sex marriage."); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634
(1996) ("[Llaws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.");
see also Steve Sanders, Making It Up: Lessons for Equal Protection Doctrine from
the Use and Abuse of Hypothesized Purposes in the Marriage Equality Litigation,
68 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 684-90 (2017); COREY BRETIsCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE
SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY? 33 (2012) ("What is significant about the doctrine of
animus as a whole is that it suggests that, in order to determine whether a law
violates a right, we need to examine the available reasons and motivations for that
law.").
69 See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (holding
that a class of one may assert an equal protection claim where treatment was
alleged to be "irrational and wholly arbitrary"); cf. Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of
Agri., 553 U.S. 591, 605 (2008) (holding that a class-of-one equal protection
theory is "simply a poor fit in the public employment context"); see also William D.
Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One/Failing Equal Protection, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
435, 443-50 (2013) (discussing the current state of the class-of-one doctrine).
70 McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005);
see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 597 (2014) (Alito, J., concur-
ring) (noting the absence of evidence of "discriminatory intent" and explaining that
"I would view this case very differently if the omission of these synagogues were
intentional"); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 540-42 (1993) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion) ("Relevant evidence includes,
among other things, the historical background of the decision under challenge,
the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question,
and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous tate-
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clined multiple invitations to overrule its decision in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, which looks first to government purpose as a com-
ponent of its three-part test.71 Purpose also looms large in the
context of the Free Exercise Clause, in which one important
component of a court's analysis is whether the "object or pur-
pose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious con-
duct."72 And not just religion but the speech protections of the
First Amendment have given rise to judicial tests involving pur-
pose or intent; to take one example, the Court has explained
that "even a regulation neutral on its face may be content-
based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of
the message it conveys."
73
Substantive due process cases represent another example.
Although the most famous phrase from Planned Parenthood v.
Casey is "undue burden"-the test it announced for evaluating
the constitutionality of abortion restrictions-the Court also
explained that a regulation imposes an "undue burden" when it
has a "purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."74
The post-Casey decision Mazurek v. Armstrong75 has been
ments made by members of the decisionmaking body," and citing numerous
statements by "residents, members of the city council, and other city officials"
demonstrating "significant hostlity ... toward the Santeria religion and its prac-
tice of animal sacrifice"); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254 (1982) (finding in
legislative history evidence that a selective registration and reporting requirement
"was drafted with the explicit intention of including particular religious denomi-
nations and excluding others").
71 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S 602, 612 (1971) ("[The statute must have a
secular legislative purpose.... ."); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
314 (2000) ("Under the Lemon standard, a court must invalidate a statute if it
lacks 'a secular legislative purpose.'").
72 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533.
73 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994); Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amend-
ment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413, 414 (1996) ("[The application of First
Amendment law is best understood and most readily explained as a kind of
motive-hunting."); Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L.
REv. 231, 285 (2012) (comparing the First Amendment prohibition on content
discrimination to equal protection jurisprudence). When it comes to the First
Amendment, still other bodies of doctrine could be implicated-in particular the
law that surrounds government speech-but I have not engaged with such mater-
ials here. See generally Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (holding that specialty license plates were govern-
ment speech; thus the state could reject a confederate flag design without violat-
ing the First Amendment); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government
Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 989 (2005) (considering government participation
in public debate).
74 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992) (emphasis added).
75 520 U.S. 968, 973 (1997).
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widely read in the lower courts as limiting the force of Casey's
"purpose" language,76 and the Court's most recent encounter
with a restrictive abortion regulation, Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt, focused overwhelmingly on the effects of the chal-
lenged law.7 7 But the purpose prong remains very much a part
of the constitutional law of abortion.
78
When it comes to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
"cruel and unusual punishments," the Court has focused since
the 1970s on the intent of government actors. The Court held
in Estelle v. Gamble that the denial of adequate medical care to
prisoners would violate the Eighth Amendment only if it in-
volved the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"7 9 ; the
Court explained that unintentional conduct, "although it may
produce.., anguish, is not on that basis alone to be character-
ized as wanton infliction of unnecessary pain,"80 but that delib-
erate misconduct, such as the intentional denial or delay of
access to medical care, would constitute a constitutional viola-
tion.8 1 Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis similarly
asks about penological purpose.8 2 And at least some justices
76 See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 493 (7th Cir. 1999) ("While a
plaintiff can challenge an abortion regulation on the ground that the regulation
was enacted with an impermissible purpose, the joint opinion in Casey and the
Court's later decision in Mazurek suggest that such a challenge will rarely be
successful, absent some sort of explicit indication from the state that it was acting
in furtherance of an improper purpose." (citation omitted)).
77 See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2304 (2016)
(finding that the plaintiffs failed "to proffer competent evidence contradicting the
legislature's statement of a legitimate purpose"). See generally Reva B. Siegel &
Linda Greenhouse, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for the Abor-
tion Right After Whole Woman's Health, 126 YALE L.J.F. 149 (2016).
78 Indeed, the lower-court opinion in Whole Woman's Health struck down a
portion of the law in part based on the impermissible purpose it found to have
animated the legislature. See Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d
673, 685-86 (W.D. Tex. 2014) ("[Tihe court concludes ... that the ambulatory-
surgical-center equirement was intended to close existing licensed abortion clin-
ics.") (emphasis added). Other lower-court decisions focused on the intent of
government actors include Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d
218, 229 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (enjoining Texas's fetal tissue disposal requirements
based in part on "evidence [the Department of State Health Services'] stated inter-
est is a pretext for its true purpose, restricting abortions"); Planned Parenthood of
Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042, 1049 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[TIhe record,
the stipulated facts, and the additional findings of the court suggest that subject-
ing the plaintiff to review [prior to the approval of clinic construction] had the
intended effect of impeding or preventing access to abortions." (emphasis added)).
79 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
80 Id. at 105.
81 Id. at 104-05; see also Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of
Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1401-04 (2008) (assessing the
role of official intent in the law of punishment).
82 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003); Ristroph, supra note 81, at
1375-79.
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take the position that when it comes to methods of execution,
punishments can only be "cruel and unusual" if they are "pur-
posely designed to inflict pain and suffering beyond that neces-
sary to cause death."
8 3
Even cases arising under the Dormant or Negative Com-
merce Clause typically involve an inquiry into government pur-
pose. The Court has explained that the doctrine prohibits
"regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic in-
terests by burdening out-of-state competitors.
'"8 4
Turning now to the types of evidence on which courts rely
in identifying impermissible intent or purpose, Village of Arling-
ton Heights supplies the most frequently cited guidance. The
Court in that case advised that in seeking evidence of the sort
of discriminatory intent that would constitute a violation of
equal protection, "[the legislative or administrative history may
be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary
statements by members of the decisionmaking body."8 5 The
Court noted that in some circumstances, "members [of such
bodies] might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning
the purpose of the official action," though it also acknowledged
83 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 96 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis
added); see Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947)
(rejecting a challenge to a second attempt at electrocution, after a first attempt
failed, on the grounds that, "[tlhe fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented
the prompt consummation of the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add an element
of cruelty to a subsequent execution. There Is no purpose to inflict unnecessary
pain"). But see John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Cruel," 105 GEO. L.J.
441, 464 (2017) (arguing that "[tihe linguistic and historical evidence demon-
strates that a punishment is cruel and unusual within the original meaning of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause if its effects are unjustly harsh in light of
longstanding prior punishment practice," without regard to the intent of the
punisher).
84 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) ("This 'negative' aspect of
the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regulatory mea-
sures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors.") (emphasis added); see Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 498
U.S. 358, 386 (1991) (rejecting dormant commerce clause challenge to state tax,
and explaining that, "Although [plaintiff] repeats the Governor's statement [that
the SBT was enacted 'to promote the development and investment of business
within Michigan'] in an attempt to demonstrate an impermissible motive on the
part of the State, all the contemporaneous evidence concerning passage of the
SBT suggests a benign motivation, combined with a practical need to increase
revenues" (quoting id. at 386); see also Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1091, 1092 (1986) ("In the central area of dormant commerce clause juris-
prudence .. . the Court has been concerned exclusively with preventing states
from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism.").
85 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268
(1977).
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that "such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege."86
In addition, the Court pointed to the "specific sequence of
events leading up the challenged decision" as also potentially
"shed[ding some light on the decisionmaker's purposes. "8 7
The Court has supplied similar guidance in cases arising
under the Establishment Clause, where it has closely scruti-
nized sequences of events, advising (in a case involving the
installation of a display of the Ten Commandments) that "an
understanding of official objective emerges from readily discov-
erable fact."88 And the Court's approach to Free Exercise cases
has been similar: in the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye case,
Justice Kennedy explained that "[iun determining if the object of
a law is a neutral one," a court should look to evidence that
includes "the historical background of the decision under chal-
lenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or
official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative
history, including contemporaneous tatements made by mem-
bers of the decisionmaking body."8 9 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court cited numerous statements by "residents, members
of the city council, and other city officials."90
I should pause here to note that the Court's focus on pur-
pose and intent in constitutional adjudication is a fairly recent
development9 1-for much of our history, the Supreme Court
expressly disclaimed the propriety of any inquiry into govern-
86 Id. As I elaborate on in Part III, both "speech or debate" and other privileges
that apply in the context of legislative officials are generally inapplicable to execu-
tive-branch officials. See infra Part III.
87 Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
88 McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005).
89 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
540 (1993). This portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined only by Justice
Stevens, but only Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist took explicit issue
with the opinion's examination of decision-maker statements and intent. See id.
at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do not join that section because It departs from
the opinion's general focus on the object of the laws at Issue to consider the
subjective motivation of the lawmakers.").
90 Id. at 541-42.
91 The Court in the constitutional law staple Fletcher v. Peck, for example,
famously cautioned that a court "cannot sustain a suit . . . founded on the
allegation that the act is a nullity, in consequence of the impure motives which
influenced certain members of the legislature which passed the law." 10 U.S. 87,
131 (1810). In the famous jurisdiction-stripping case Exparte McArdle, the Court
explained that "[w]e are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature."
74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869). And cases through the 1960s and early 1970s continued
to echo this sentiment: in Palmer v. Thompson, the Court rejected a challenge to a
city's decision to close, rather than desegregate, its public pools; although the
plaintiffs argued that the decision "violates the Equal Protection Clause because
the decision to close the pools was motivated by a desire to avoid integration of the
races," the Court explained that "no case in this Court has held that a legislative
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ment purpose in constitutional cases, although its disavowals
were arguably stronger than its actual practice9 2-and also
subject to significant criticism.9 3 An important recent article,
by Professor Richard Fallon, offers a sweeping critique of the
Court's approach to intent and purpose in constitutional law,
including in many of the cases surveyed above. Arguing that
many of the Court's cases demonstrate confusion or even inco-
herence when it comes to their identification of constitution-
ally-forbidden intent-including in their frequent failure to
distinguish between subjective and objective conceptions of in-
tent-Fallon argues for an approach in which "courts should
never invalidate legislation solely because of the subjective in-
tentions of those who enacted it. Instead, in all cases, final
determinations of statutes' validity should depend on their lan-
guage and effects.
'" 94
Critically, however, Professor Fallon also explains that his
analysis focuses on the "peculiar problems posed by judicial
inquiries into the intentions of multimember legislative bodies
for the purpose of determining the validity of statutes or other
policies."95 He explains that questions regarding the intent of
other players, like executive-branch officials, "do not present
the main conceptual problem with which I am concerned, in-
volving the aggregation of the mental states of multiple officials
act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who
voted for it." 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (emphasis added).
92 Caleb Nelson provides the most detailed account of the history to date.
Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1784,
1812-42 (2008); see also Coenen, supra note 20, at 356 (describing "various
rationales for motives-based analysis in constitutional law").
93 Commentators have been especially critical of the Court's fixation on gov-
ernment purpose or intent in the equal protection context. See, e.g., David E.
Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REv. 885,904 (2016) ("Race discrim-
ination doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause, for example, turns on govern-
ment intent; yet the Court has made this intent standard 'extraordinarily difficult'
for plaintiffs to satisfy .... ." (citation omitted)); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional
Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3181-83 (2015) (critiquing
the Court's focus on intent in equal protection doctrine); Reva B. Siegel, Foreword:
Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REv. 1, 20-23 (2013) (describing the shift from
Impact to purpose in equal protection analysis).
94 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130
HARV. L. REV. 523, 529 (2016). Professor Fallon does, however, agree that evi-
dence of intent may be considered-his main objection is to according intent
dispositive weight. He also proposes one significant exception: "if it is well known
that some members of the legislature (but less than a majority) voted for a statute
with the aim of harming a racial or religious minority, their intentions might
contribute to the statute's overall expressive impact in marginalizing or stigma-
tizing that minority," which should at least give rise to heightened scrutiny. Id. at
530.
95 Id. at 530.
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into a collective intent of a decisionmaking body."96 Professor
Fallon's insightful critique of intent doctrines in the case of
statutes, then, seems to lack any real force in the context of
executive-branch players who are the focus of the next Part.
II
ExEcuTivE INTENT: DOcTRINE AND DEBATES
This Part turns to the executive. It first argues that in cases
featuring "constitutionally suspect intent," courts ordinarily
make no distinction between legislative and executive officials;
it also discusses the role of intent in "qualified immunity" doc-
trine, where cases typically involve constitutional claims
against executive-branch officials. It then identifies several
pockets of constitutionally-inflected administrative law that
also assign significance to decision-maker intent, including
considering outside statements as evidence of that intent, and
contrasts those lines of cases to ordinary administrative law's
aversion to intent inquiries. Finally, it briefly considers the
nascent academic literature on the interpretation of executive-
branch regulations. This Part remains focused on executive-
branch officials other than the President, before turning
squarely to the President in Part III.
A. Constitutionally Suspect Intent Beyond the Legislature
Although some of the language in the cases discussed
above presumes the existence of decision-making bodies9 7
rather than individual decision makers, the government offi-
cials in the cases themselves are in fact a mix of legislators and
executive-branch officials. Where constitutional claims involve
aspects of the democratic process, like redistricting and disen-
franchisement, challenges are typically to statutes or constitu-
tional amendments.9 8 But in cases involving matters like jury
96 Id. at 531. But see Michael C. Doff, Even a Dog: A Response to Professor
Fa/!on, 130 HARV. L. REv. F. 86, 88 (2016) (arguing that despite this caveat, "Fallon
does not really think that aggregating individual intent presents insuperable diffi-
culties," and that in any event Fallon's main argument applies with equal force to
non-legislative actors-which, on Professor Dorfs view, supplies one reason for
overall caution regarding Fallon's normative recommendations).
97 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268
(1977); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("[Tihe statute
must have a secular legislative purpose . . ").
98 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993); Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
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selection,99 discrimination in employment'0 0 or education,
10 1
the treatment of prisoners,10 2 and religious discrimination
under either the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause, it is
frequently actors within the executive branch whose conduct is
in question. To be sure, many of the cases involve ground-level
actors within the executive branch, rather than the President
or other senior officials (either state or federal). But courts'
application of intent tests in these cases is a strong indication
that intent and purpose are just as relevant in constitutional
cases involving executive action as they are when legislation is
at issue. And, despite the occasional reference to "decision-
making bodies," nothing in the logic of those cases seems lim-
ited to legislative, rather than executive, officials-and indeed,
at the state and local level, where many of these cases arise,
there is often less rigid separation between legislative and exec-
utive officials and functions than is true in the federal
system. 103
Consider the Court's most recent encounter with this issue
in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.
Justice Kennedy's controlling opinion rested largely on what
the Court perceived as antireligious animus on the part of the
Colorado commission that ruled in favor of a same-sex couple
denied service at Masterpiece Cakeshop. As evidence of that
animus, Justice Kennedy highlighted statements by several in-
dividual commissioners; taken together, the Court found that
these statements reflected "clear and impermissible hostility
toward ... sincere religious beliefs."10 4 Although acknowledg-
99 See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016); Snyder v.
Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008).
100 See, e.g., Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1979)
("Discriminatory intent must be shown in fourteenth-amendment actions against
government agencies.").
101 See, e.g., Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 234
(1964) (invalidating school board decision to close all public schools rather than
desegregate them); id. at 222 n.6 (citing the Board's public explanation of its
refusal to appropriate money or levy taxes to carry on the county's public school
system: "Knowing the people of this county as we do, we know that it is not
possible to operate the schools of this county within the terms of that principle [of
admission without regard to race] and, at the same time, maintain an atmosphere
conducive to the educational benefit of our people").
102 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
103 For example, in McCreary v. ACLU, one of the Ten Commandments dis-
plays at issue was erected by an official the opinion describes as a "Judge-Execu-
tive." See McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851
(2005). See generally, Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence,
117 MICH. L. REv. 1537 (2019).




ing different views on the relevance of decision maker state-
ments in the context of legislation, the opinion suggested that
here the commissioners' statements were clearly relevant, as
they were made "by an adjudicatory body deciding a particular
case."10 5 So the statements of these administrative actors, sit-
ting in an adjudicatory capacity, were deemed relevant, per-
haps in part because of the speakers' identity. And this seemed
to be the view not only of Justice Kennedy, but of the entire
Supreme Court, since none of the three separate writings
seemed to depart from this aspect of the majority opinion
(though Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor suggested that
these comments, though unfortunate, were trivial1 0 6).
Masterpiece is unusual in even acknowledging the status of
the government actor whose intent is deemed relevant, but
earlier case law confirms the relevance of both the intentions
and the statements of executive-branch officials. The govern-
ment actors in McCreary v. ACLU, a frequently-cited Establish-
ment Clause case involving a Ten Commandments display, are
alternately referred to as "Executives" and "Judge-Execu-
tives."10 7 And the school officials responsible for "direct[ing]
the performance of a formal religious exercise at promotional
and graduation ceremonies," struck down by the Court in Lee
v. Weisman, are best thought of as executive-branch
officials. 10 8
Also relevant to these debates is the doctrine of qualified
immunity, which involves judicial inquiries into the intent or
knowledge of actors within the executive branch, both federal
officials under Bivens10 9 and state officials under § 1983.110 As
the Court has explained, qualified immunity confers on public
officials protection from damages liability under some circum-
stances. While the language of subjective intent once appeared
in the Court's qualified immunity cases,'1 ' the Court in Harlow
105 Id. at 1730.
106 Id. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See generally Leslie Kendrick &
Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARv. L. REv. 133, 133 (2018)
(arguing that in cases such as Masterpiece, the Court scrutinizes state officials'
adjudicative etiquette more than the Constitutional principles at stake).
107 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850.
108 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992).
109 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
110 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
111 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974); see also Pozen, supra note 93, at 898-99 ("Where [quali-
fied immunity] does apply, the Court has narrowed its focus to objective reasona-
bleness and 'purged' any consideration of motive from the qualified immunity
analysis . . . )).
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v. Fitzgerald broke with such tests, setting forth a rule that
"government officials performing discretionary functions gener-
ally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or consti-
tutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known"112-what is now known as an "objective" standard. In
rejecting the subjective test, the Court referenced the "substan-
tial costs attend[ing] the litigation of the subjective good faith of
government officials," 113 and explained that "Uludicial inquiry
into subjective motivation... may entail broad-ranging discov-
ery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an offi-
cial's professional colleagues. Inquiries of this kind can be
peculiarly disruptive of effective government."
1 14
Under this test, then, intent or knowledge is typically im-
puted based on surrounding circumstances, rather than de-
rived from evidence of conduct or speech outside of the
particular sequence of events in question. But the Court has
also made clear that in qualified immunity cases, "[wihen in-
tent is an element of a constitutional violation"-for example,
in the equal protection context-Harlow's objective test does
not preclude an inquiry into the intent of the official in ques-
tion.115 Even in the qualified immunity context, then, where
the Court has for decades rejected subjective notions of intent,
there is room for inquiry-in particular in cases where a partic-
ular doctrinal test so provides-into the intent of government
officials. 116 So the doctrine of qualified immunity further sup-
ports the relevance of intent of executive-branch officials
(though in application it often shields such officials from
liability). 117
112 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) ("Government officials are entitled to qualified im-
munity with respect to 'discretionary functions' performed in their official
capacities.").
113 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
114 Id. at 817 (footnote omitted).
115 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998); see also Lisa R. Eskow &
Kevin W. Cole, The Unqualified Paradoxes of Qualified Immunity: Reasonably Mis-
taken Beliefs, Reasonably Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter of Subjective
Intent That Haunts Objective Legal Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 869, 871
(1998) (explaining that in Crawford-El, the Supreme Court held that Harlow's
objective legal reasonableness tandard "does not preclude inquiry into a defen-
dant's subjective intent when intent is an element of the plaintiffs claim").
116 SeeEskow&Cole, supranote 115, at 871.
117 See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1865-69 (2017). But see Alex-
ander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences
for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813 (2010) ("Bivens cases
are much more successful than has been assumed by the legal community ... ");
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B. Constitutionally Inflected Administrative Law
In addition to these constitutional cases, pockets of admin-
istrative law feature judicial inquiries into the intent of execu-
tive-branch actors. All of these cases involve executive-branch
actors other than the President.1 18 But, like the cases dis-
cussed above, they may shed light on questions of intent and
the President. Accordingly, the first sub-Part below surveys a
line of administrative-law cases which appear under the rubric
of the "unalterably closed mind" doctrine. The next sub-Part
discusses the Court's well-known case Accardi v.
Shaughnessy.
Discussions of intent or purpose in the context of legisla-
tion are comparatively straightforward, in that the government
action in question always takes the same form-a bill, passed
by both houses of Congress, and signed by the President or
with supermajorities over his veto. Executive action, by con-
trast, comes in many (almost limitless) forms. Within the ad-
ministrative state, agencies issue regulations and adjudicate
disputes; they also issue interpretive rules, generate state-
ments of policy, and produce other kinds of informal guidance
materials. 119 Most such agency instruments are subject to ju-
dicial review, and in several discrete areas of administrative law
doctrine, courts focus on the intent of administrative actors in
ruling on such challenges.
1. Administrative Law's "Unalterably Closed Mind"
Doctrine
A number of administrative-law cases entertain questions
regarding the intent or state of mind of administrative decision
makers, including examining extrinsic statements as relevant
evidence, under the rubric of the "unalterably closed mind"
doctrine. This doctrine, which arises in the context of both
rulemaking and adjudication, is an important one from the
perspective of this piece: it is concerned with intent, and it
see also William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REv. 45,
60-61 (2018) (describing and criticizing qualified Immunity doctrine).
118 Indeed, the President scarcely appears in these cases, but that is hardly
unique; as a general matter, "courts tend to ignore presidential involvement when
reviewing agency actions." Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Super-
vise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1857 (2015).
119 See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 219, 219 (1993) (arguing that the literature on presiden-
tial control has not been sufficiently attentive to "different types of agency
decisionmaking," and proposing as a "rough cut" the categories of "adjudication,
selection of regulatory strategies, value selection, and statutory interpretation").
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explicitly grapples with the problem of government actors who
speak in several registers-as political figures with policy
views, on the one hand, and also as public officials wielding
particular legal authorities, on the other. Indeed, some of the
cases explicitly discuss the question of how statements made
by agency actors operating in the former role may impact ac-
tion taken in the latter. In brief, these cases endorse the view
that intent may be relevant in assessing and on occasion invali-
dating agency action; and, although they articulate a standard
that is difficult to satisfy on the basis of extrinsic evidence, they
do not erect an insuperable obstacle to the use of such
statements.
As the D.C. Circuit has explained on a number of occa-
sions, "agencies proceeding by informal rulemaking should
maintain minds open to whatever insights the comments pro-
duced by notice under [the APA's notice-and-comment
rulemaking process] may generate."120 But the standard for
successfully challenging a rulemaking or disqualifying a deci-
sion maker on the grounds that a decision-making process or
particular decision maker has failed to maintain an open mind,
or prejudged an outcome, is a very high one: "a Commissioner
should be disqualified only when there has been a clear and
convincing showing that the agency member has an unalter-
ably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the
proceeding." 121
So in Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, sev-
eral associations of advertisers and toy manufacturers sought
to prevent Michael Pertschuk, Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission, from participating in a rulemaking regarding ad-
vertising that targeted children. 122 They prevailed in the trial
court, relying on Pertschuk's public remarks in various ve-
nues. 123 The most important of these was a speech before a
research conference, in which Pertschuk argued that "children
have only a minimal understanding of the nature of television
commercials and are unable to distinguish between advertising
and other forms of information," and quoted a finding that
"many children do not have the sophistication or experience
needed to understand that advertising is not just another form
of informational programming."124 But the D.C. Circuit re-
120 NRDC v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
121 Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(emphasis added).
122 Id. at 1155.
123 Id. at 1156.
124 Id. at 1171.
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versed the trial court, explaining that "[tihe mere discussion of
policy or advocacy on a legal question . . . is not sufficient to
disqualify an administrator."125 The court explained that "[aln
agency member may be disqualified . . . only when there is a
clear and convincing showing that he has an unalterably
closed mind."12 6 The opinion concluded by noting that
The appellees have a right to a fair and open proceeding; that
right includes access to an impartial decisionmaker. Impar-
tial, however, does not mean uninformed, unthinking, or in-
articulate .... We would eviscerate the proper evolution of
policymaking were we to disqualify every administrator who
has opinions on the correct course of his agency's future
action. 1
27
Another case involving an FTC rule, Consumers Union v.
FTC, featured a consumer challenge to an FTC decision to omit
from a final "Used Car Rule" a provision that would have re-
quired used-car dealers to affix to windshields stickers notify-
ing prospective buyers of any known defects. 128 The plaintiffs
raised an objection to the impartiality of the chairman, on the
grounds that during the comment period he apparently in-
formed a reporter "that the Revised Rule would not contain a
known-defects provision," and at a press conference com-
mented that an earlier iteration of the rule without a known-
defects provision "is the rule that I think best."129 Explaining
that such evidence "gives no indication of a mind that has been
closed to the evidence in the past or that would disregard any
significant new material subsequently introduced,"130 the
court found that neither statement "approaches the 'clear and
convincing evidence' that must be produced to prove that [the
chairman] had 'an unalterably closed mind on matters critical
to the disposition of the proceeding.'"
131
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1154.
127 Id. at 1174.
128 Consumers Union v. FTC, 801 F.2d 417, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
129 Id. at 426.
130 Id. at 427.
131 Id. (quoting Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1170); see also
Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("Although the Secretary might prefer that state governments regulate 'public
health issues' because they have 'traditionally been a primary concern of state
and local officials,' Congress ... decided that the federal government would take
the lead .... [Tihe Secretary may not withhold or delay issuance of a standard
within his jurisdiction because he holds a different vision of the federal govern-
ment's role in this field than the role envisioned by Congress and enacted into law
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These and other cases set a high bar for challenges to
rulemaking based on an official's outside statements. But
where the agency conduct in question is an adjudication rather
than a rulemaking, courts have at times set aside agency ac-
tion or disqualified particular actors based on outside state-
ments. The leading case here is Cinderella Career and
Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, in which the FTC ordered a group
of "finishing schools" to cease and desist from certain practices
and representations the Commission concluded were "unfair
and deceptive" 132 regarding the value of a Cinderella education
and the career prospects of program graduates. Cinderella
challenged the order against it, pointing to a speech by FTC
Commissioner Dixon, which it argued undermined the integrity
of the FTC proceeding. 133 The speech included this language:
What kind of vigor can a reputable newspaper exhibit? ...
What would be the attitude toward accepting good money for
... ads that offer college educations in five weeks .... or
becoming an airline's hostess by attending a charm school?
... Granted that newspapers are not in the advertising polic-
ing business, their advertising managers are savvy enough to
smell deception when the odor is strong enough. 134
Quoting this speech and concluding that a decision maker
must be disqualified from participating in an adjudication if "a
disinterested observer may conclude that [he] has in some
measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular
case in advance of hearing it," 13 the court vacated the order
and remanded to the FTC with directions to reconsider the
132 The complaint alleged that Cinderella made the following claims:
1. Petitioners make educational loans to students who register for
courses at the Cinderella Career and Finishing School. 2. School
Services, Inc. is a government or public nonprofit organization that
has officially approved the Cinderella School or its courses. 3. Di-
anna Batts, 'Miss U.S.A. 1965,' and Carol Ness, 'Miss Cinderella
1965,' were graduates of the Cinderella School and owe their suc-
cess to the courses they took there. 4. and 5. Petitioners offer
courses of instruction which qualify students to become airline
stewardesses and buyers for retail stores. 6. Petitioners find jobs for
their students in almost all cases through their job placement ser-
vice. 7. Graduates of petitioners' courses are qualified to assume
executive positions. 8. Cinderella Career and Finishing School is the
official Washington, D.C., headquarters for the Miss Universe
Beauty Pageant. 9. Cinderella Career College and Finishing School
is a college.
Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 584 n. 1 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
133 id. at 584.
134 Id. at 589-90 (emphasis added).




evidence against Cinderella, without the participation of Com-
missioner Dixon. 1
3 6
Although it has not addressed the issue in much detail, the
Supreme Court has on occasion opined on the question of
when the expressed views of administrative actors might taint
the output of administrative processes, in particular adjudica-
tory processes. Most notably, an aspect of United States v.
Morgan, one of several Supreme Court encounters with the
protracted litigation surrounding rate-setting at the Kansas
City Stockyards under the Packers and Stockyards Act, in-
volved the impact of the Agriculture Secretary's public state-
ments on his rate determination. In the case's last trip to the
Supreme Court,13 7 the party challenging the rate determina-
tion attempted to disqualify the Secretary because of a critical
letter he had written to the New York Times regarding the out-
come of one of the earlier cases. 138 The Court responded to this
attempted disqualification:
That [the Secretary] not merely held but expressed strong
views on matters believed by him to have been in issue, did
not unfit him for exercising his duty in subsequent proceed-
ings ordered by this Court .... In publicly criticizing this
Court's opinion the Secretary merely indulged in a practice
familiar in the long history of Anglo-American litigation,
whereby unsuccessful litigants and lawyers give vent to their
disappointment in tavern or press. Cabinet officers charged
by Congress with adjudicatory functions are not assumed to
be flabby creatures any more than judges are. Both may
have an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific
case. But both are assumed to be men of conscience and
intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular contro-
versy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances. 1
39
Morgan is often read as establishing a high bar to the disquali-
fication of an administrative official, and also as setting forth
something of a presumption of good faith on the part of such
officials. And indeed, the language excerpted above supports
that reading. But it is also significant that the Court did not
dismiss entirely the possibility that the Secretary's views on an
136 ICL
137 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941); United States v. Mor-
gan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939); United States v. Morgan, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Morgan v.
United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
138 Henry A. Wallagh, Letter to the Editor, Secretary Wallace Explains Kansas
City Rate Decision" Head of Department of Agriculture Sees No Rebuke in the
Hughes Pronouncement, but Believes Livestock Men Have Suffered Injustice, N.Y.
TIrMES, May 8, 1938, at 72.
139 Morgan, 313 U.S. at 421.
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op-ed page might be relevant; rather, it seemed only to find that
the particular views articulated in the letter at issue had no
bearing on the Secretary's ability to participate in subsequent
agency proceedings.
Another Supreme Court case, FTC v. Cement Institute, 140
featured a price-fixing charge against cement manufacturers.
One of the respondents, Marquette, argued that "the Commis-
sion had previously prejudged the issues, was 'prejudiced and
biased against the Portland cement industry generally,' and
that the industry and Marquette in particular could not receive
a fair hearing from the Commission."14 1 As evidence, Mar-
quette pointed to Commission reports and testimony by indi-
vidual commissioners, which made clear that some or all
members of the Commission believed that the sort of point
system utilized by the cement manufacturers did constitute a
restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. But the
Court held that even assuming that "such an opinion had been
formed by the entire membership of the Commission as a result
of its prior official investigations .... [Tihis belief did not dis-
qualify the Commission."14 2 Those opinions had been formed
prior to the adversarial process in which the respondents had a
right to participate, and they did not establish "that the minds
of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject of the
respondents' . . . practices."14 3
To be sure, these cases erect a high hurdle to actually
invalidating agency action or disqualifying an official because
of outside statements, especially in the context of rulemaking.
But it seems quite significant that all consider the words of the
executive-branch actors in question. And, although not all
identify the source of the requirement that agency decision
makers remain open-minded and unbiased, the Due Process
Clause seems the most natural source of the obligation-the
right to a fair hearing is broadly understood as foundational to
due process. 144 These cases, then, in their focus on intent and
state of mind, seem in many ways extensions of the constitu-
tional cases surveyed in the preceding sub-Part. 145
140 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
141 Id. at 700.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 701.
144 Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) ("It is
axiomatic that '[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due pro-
cess.'" (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))).
145 A handful of similar cases involve formal adjudications under section 554
of the APA. What courts call the "will to win" doctrine excludes from decision-
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2. Accardi v. Shaughnessy
Although it is not typically considered an "unalterably
closed mind" case, the important administrative-law case Ac-
cardi v. Shaughnessy146 closely resembles the cases above-
featuring similar facts and the articulation of similar princi-
ples. Accardi involved a challenge to a deportation order.
14 7
The primary grounds for the challenge were the Attorney Gen-
eral's statements at a press conference that he "planned to
deport certain 'unsavory characters,"' together with his prepa-
ration of a list of individuals, including the petitioner, to be
targeted for deportation.'48 The petitioner argued that this
amounted to "public prejudgment by the Attorney General,"
rendering "fair consideration of petitioner's case by the Board
of Immigration Appeals . . . impossible."
149
In a short and somewhat opaque opinion, the Court held
that the Attorney General, by circumscribing the discretion of
the Board of Immigration Appeals, had violated a regulation
that conferred on the Board the power to exercise discretion
when it came to deportation determinations. 150
The case is primarily known as the source of "the Accardi
principle," a requirement hat agencies follow their own regula-
tions. ' 5 1 This principle, as a number of commentators have
noted, is undertheorized: the Court has not, in Accardi or any
other case, explained the source of the rule. 152 But it is argua-
making processes individuals who previously held prosecutorial or investigative
roles-or any related role that has engendered a "will to win"-in the same matter
or a related one. See Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of
Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 759, 773
(1981) ("The primary purpose of separating functions is to screen from decision-
making those who have a will to win, a psychological commitment to achieving a
particular result because of involvement on the agency's team."); see also Grolier
Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1980) (analyzing the APA's legisla-
tive history and finding that Congress drafted section 554(d) in part to address its
concern over the "man who has buried himself in one side of an issue" and thus
disabled himself "from bringing to its decision that dispassionate judgment which
Anglo-American tradition demands of officials who decide questions").
146 347 U.S. 260, 264-65 (1954).
147 Id. at 263-64.
148 Id. at 264.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 267 ("[Tlhe petition for habeas corpus charges the Attorney General
with precisely what the regulations forbid him to do: dictating the Board's
decision.").
151 Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569, 569
(2006) (describing the Accardi principle as a rule that "[a]gencies must comply
with their own regulations").
152 See id. ("The Supreme Court has never settled on an explanation for the
source of this duty. The Court has variously suggested that it is inherent in the
nature of delegated 'legislative power'; that it is required by due process; and that
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bly a due process interest in unbiased and fair decision mak-
ing, of the same sort at issue in the cases discussed above, that
underlies the rule. The petitioner challenged the Attorney Gen-
eral's bias; the manifestation of that bias or prejudgment ap-
peared in the circulated list and the Attorney General's press
conference remarks. One reading of Accardi, then, is that when
impermissible intent, here in the form of bias, infects agency
decision making, the resulting decision contravenes the Con-
stitution and must be set aside. And, crucially, the Accardi
Court did not hesitate to consider the content of the Attorney
General's public remarks in reaching its decision.
C. Intent in Ordinary Administrative Law
In contrast to the cases above, in the mine run of adminis-
trative-law cases-in which courts seek to answer questions
about things like the consistency of agency action with the
requirements of various provisions of the APA, or some other
statute-administrative-law doctrine actually discourages in-
quiries into matters like intent. The Morgan cases, discussed
above, are often cited as establishing the principle that courts
should hesitate before inquiring into the motives of agency offi-
cials. And the Supreme Court in the famous case Overton Park
elaborated on Morgan, suggesting that a court may only probe
the "mental processes of administrative decisionmakers"153
where there has been some threshold showing of bad faith or
improper motive (though it has allowed for the propriety of
such inquiries where officials have given no explanation for
their decisions). And, as a corollary, it is black letter law that
when reviewing administrative action, courts' review is limited
both to the record before the agency and to the justifications
offered by the agency at the time of the action under review. 15 4
In one significant case involving these principles, the en
banc D.C. Circuit declined to review the transcripts of the
closed proceedings of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
which the plaintiffs had obtained and wished to use in their
challenge to a licensing decision. The court refused the review
on the grounds that no threshold showing of bad faith or im-
proper motive had been made without reference to the tran-
it is a principle of administrative common law. The sparse commentary is not very
helpful in sorting out the underpinnings of the Accardi principle either.").
153 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971);
see also United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
154 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 158 (1962).
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scripts themselvesi5 5 (though four members of the current
Supreme Court appear to view this case as an unwarranted
extension of Overton Park and Morgan1 56).
These cases suggest hat where courts evaluate agency ac-
tion, most of the time there is no space to consider the intent of
agency decision makers. But even these cases allow for the
possibility that with a sufficiently strong threshold showing,
both intent and the materials that might establish it may be
permissible subjects of judicial inquiry.
D. Intent in Regulatory Interpretation
One additional aspect of administrative law may be rele-
vant to the evaluation of executive action: regulatory interpre-
tation. When it comes to agency regulations issued pursuant
to the APA's notice-and-comment procedures, an emerging
literature has begun to grapple with the same sorts of interpre-
tive questions that have long preoccupied commentators in the
context of statutory interpretation.
Professor Kevin Stack is largely responsible for sparking
this debate. In his article Interpreting Regulations, Stack ob-
serves that despite the centrality of regulations as sources of
law, "courts have not developed a consistent approach to regu-
latory interpretation."157 Attempting to offer such an ap-
proach, Stack advocates a method of interpretation he calls
"regulatory purposivism"-essentially an application of Hart
and Sacks' purposivist method of statutory interpretation to
the interpretation of regulations. 158 Stack argues that the pre-
mise that "every statute and every doctrine of unwritten law...
has some kind of purpose or objective"'59 has special force in
155 There may be cases where a court is warranted in examining the
deliberative proceedings of the agency. But such cases must be the
rare exception if agencies are to engage in uninhibited and frank
discussions during their deliberations. Were courts regularly to re-
view the transcripts of agency deliberative proceedings, the discus-
sions would be conducted with judicial scrutiny in mind. Such
agency proceedings would then be useless both to the agency and to
the courts. We think the analogy to the deliberative processes of a
court is an apt one. Without the assurance of secrecy, the court
could not fully perform its functions.
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 789 F.2d
26, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
156 See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 373 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari).
157 Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REv. 355, 359
(2012).
158 Id. at 363.
159 Id. at 388.
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the context of regulations; this is largely because the presump-
tion that laws are enacted by "reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably"160  is especially well-
grounded in the context of agency actors, who are constrained
by a number of doctrines that require reasoned deliberation,
reason-giving, and a fit between offered reasons and actual
conduct. 161
Much of Stack's discussion defends reliance on the "state-
ments of basis and purpose" that accompany every regulation,
and he expressly declines to address the potential relevance of
other sources in cases in which reading statements of basis
and purpose together with a rule's substantive provisions fails
to answer the interpretive question.16 2 But his argument cer-
tainly leaves open the possibility of relying on at least certain
sorts of extrinsic agency materials, beyond the statements of
basis and purpose that are his focus.
Jennifer Nou has argued that a textualist approach is more
appropriate in the context of the interpretation of regulations,
largely on the grounds, based in textualist critiques of intent in
statutory interpretation, that it is highly unlikely that "multi-
member institutions like administrative agencies possess a
singular, identifiable intent or purpose."163 She argues that
this criticism has the most force in the context of independent
agencies headed by multimember boards and commissions,
but applies as well, for a number of institutional reasons in-
volving the President and OIRA, in the context of ordinary exec-
utive agencies. 164
Neither approach has yet won the day, and judicial ap-
proaches to interpreting regulations remain somewhat ad hoc,
with some decisions hewing closely to regulatory text and
others consulting a range of sources in interpreting regula-
tions, including not just statements of basis and purpose, but
the legislative history of the underlying statute,165 informal
160 Id. at 384-86 (citing HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1378).
161 Stack, supra note 157, at 359.
162 Id at 407 ("[In cases in which the text and the statement of basis and
purpose offer no assistance, the account of purposive regulatory interpretation
would need to be specified further and could take more textualist or purposive
variants.").
163 Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81, 94-95 (2015).
164 See il. at 94-96.
165 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Zoni Language Ctrs., Inc., 858 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir.
2017) ("The purpose of the regulation warrants no different conclusion. What
scant legislative history there is ... suggests that it was premised on the intention
to exempt workers who 'typically earned salaries well above the minimum wage,
and . . . were presumed to enjoy other compensatory privileges . .. setting them
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agency guidance documents, 166 and records of internal admin-
istrative processes.16 7 This is an important and still young
interpretive debate, and it highlights the need to engage with
questions of interpretation when it comes to the range of modes
of executive action.
The cases in this Part reflect regular invocation of the in-
tent of executive-branch actors. The "unalterably closed mind"
cases, and arguably Accardi, focus on constitutionally-
grounded notions of intent as state of mind, in particular bias
or closed-mindedness. These cases provide a powerful
counter-point to the claim that administrative law does not
engage with intent. And extrinsic evidence is central to these
cases: all ask whether statements made outside of administra-
tive-law processes indicate that decisions rendered inside of
those processes were infected by impermissible intent. In addi-
tion, the regulatory interpretation debates show scholars grap-
pling with the question of whether and how to consider the
intent of agency actors in construing regulations. This discus-
sion, then, establishes that there is much in administrative law
to support the claim that, in some instances, inquiry into the
intent of executive-branch actors is a familiar feature of our
law.
III
DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR PRESIDENTIAL INTENT
We come, finally, to the questions that began this piece:
When, if ever, should courts evaluating presidential action in-
quire into presidential intent? If such inquiries are ever appro-
priate, on what sources should courts rely in conducting the
apart from the nonexempt workers entitled to overtime pay.'" (quoting Defining
and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,124 (Apr. 23,
2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
166 See, e.g., Abington Memorial Hosp. v. Burwell, 216 F. Supp. 3d 110, 127
(D.D.C. 2016).
167 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 521 (1994)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing agency officials' reimbursement practices
under contested regulatory provision); see also Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory
Intent: The Place for a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255,
260 (2000) (arguing that "courts should pay more attention to original agency
intent and consult pre-promulgation materials"); cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph
O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115
COLUM. L. REv. 1789, 1797 (2015) ("[Iln the contexts of both statutory interpreta-
tion and administrative law" the unorthodoxies of modem lawmaking "have been
largely invisible").
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intent inquiry? And what principles might guide courts as they
approach these questions? As the preceding Parts have elabo-
rated, when it comes to the ordinary interpretation of statutes,
the quest for intent and the role of outside materials are both
hotly debated and controversial. At the same time, when it
comes to both statutes and executive action, there is substan-
tial constitutional doctrine that places official intent (and state-
ments as evidence of intent) at the center of the inquiry into
constitutionality. So too does a constitutionally-inflected slice
of administrative law, which deals explicitly with the intent and
motives of executive-branch actors. This intent-focused ad-
ministrative law stands in contrast to much of administrative-
law doctrine, with its focus on facial review and its disinclina-
tion to consider intent or evidence outside of the administrative
record.
Synthesizing all of this material in the context of the Presi-
dent, this Part argues that for a variety of structural and insti-
tutional reasons, it is ordinarily improper for courts to rely on
presidential statements to illuminate presidential intent when
it comes to the ordinary interpretation of presidential instru-
ments. But there is strong support in both constitutional and
constitutionally-inflected case law for looking to intent when a
constitutional claim is raised in the context of presidential ac-
tion. Accordingly, this Part argues that when it comes to the
scope or meaning of a presidential directive, intent inquiries
are typically misplaced, 168 but that it is appropriate and often
necessary for courts to probe presidential intent in the context
of assessing the constitutionality of presidential action. 169
This Part begins by surveying the limited existing author-
ity, both from case law and scholarship, involving presidential
intent in the context of executive orders and similar directives.
It then asks directly about applicability of the ideas of legisla-
168 For a recent argument in favor of textualism in the interpretation of presi-
dential directives, see Tara Leigh Grove, Presidential Laws and the Missing Inter-
pretive Theory, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfrn?abstractid=3338466 [https://perma.cc?EY74-RCQG].
169 Direct presidential action-that is, action without Congress-can take the
form of executive orders and presidential memoranda, see KENNETH R. MAYER,
WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 4-5 (2001);
proclamations, see HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RES. SERV., PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES:
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 14 (2008), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-611.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PFP9-743N]; and executive agreements, see Bradford R. Clark,
Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007). Although
"[t]he U.S. Constitution does not explicitly recognize any of these policy vehicles,"
they are now well-established (though not uncontroversial) tools every President
has utilized. WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DI-
RECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 7 (2003).
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tive purpose, legislative intent, and legislative history to presi-
dential intent, and to speech as evidence of that intent. It then
connects presidential directives to the administrative-law liter-
ature, and to constitutional law proper. Building on those dis-
cussions, it more fully develops the distinction described
here-between scope and meaning, on the one hand, and con-
stitutionality, on the other-and moves on to apply that frame-
work to the examples set forth in the Introduction. Finally, it
identifies and answers some key objections to the framework I
propose.
A. The Existing Authority
1. Case Law
A handful of cases not discussed above engage explicitly (if
in passing) with the question of presidential intent, so they
warrant brief discussion here, as we turn more fully to the
normative.
The first group of cases-which involve the President's
power to create private rights of action, cognizable in the fed-
eral courts, through executive orders-discuss presidential in-
tent in a way that largely mirrors discussions of legislative
intent. Several lower-court cases from the 1960s and '70s ad-
dress this question in the context of executive orders mandat-
ing nondiscrimination by government contractors. For
instance, in Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 170 a fed-
eral appeals court focused on administrative history in deter-
mining that the executive order in question should not be read
to create a private right of action. But a district court discuss-
ing a similar executive order a few years later invoked presiden-
tial intent (in addition to pragmatic considerations): '-Te
existence of a private cause of action under the executive order
would vastly complicate the administrative process contem-
plated by the order... a much more compelling demonstration
of Presidential intent to allow a private right of action would be
170 329 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1964) ("The history of the orders, the rules and
regulations made pursuant to them, and the actual practice in the enforcement of
the nondiscrimination provisions are all strong persuasive evidence, it seems to
us, that court action as a remedy was to be used only as a last resort, and that the
threat of a private civil action to deter contractors from failing to comply with the
provisions was not contemplated by the orders."); see also Farkas v. Texas Instru-
ment, 375 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 1967) ("We agree with the conclusion there [in
Farmerd reached that.., the threat of a private civil action was not contemplated
by the orders.").
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necessary in order for plaintiffs to prevail."17 1 The court offered
no real specifics on what a sufficiently compelling showing
might consist of; and in neither of the cases did any extrinsic
evidence of intent surface. Moreover, this specific right-of-ac-
tion debate is largely academic today, since the majority of
executive orders now expressly disclaim any intent to create a
private right of action. 
17 2
The Fourth Circuit, in a case interpreting an executive or-
der banning the export of certain goods to Iran, first cited the
language of the order, explaining that "[clonsistent with the
plain meaning of the term 'export,' the Executive Order in-
tended to cut off the shipment of goods intended for Iran."'
173
But the court also cited extrinsic evidence of the President's
assessment of the situation, pointing to a presidential message
to Congress: "This broad export ban reflected the President's
appraisal of the nation's interest in sanctioning Iran's sponsor-
ship of international terrorism, its frustration of the Middle
East peace process, and its pursuit of weapons of mass de-
struction."174 In another case, the Tenth Circuit considered
whether two early nineteenth-century Executive Orders termi-
nated reservations of land to the Navajo Tribe, concluding that
they did; the court cited "the circumstances surrounding [a
related statute] and EOs 1000/1284," which it concluded "re-
veal[ed] unequivocal evidence of a widely held contemporane-
ous understanding," including by Presidents, other executive-
branch officials, and legislators, that the lands in question
would return to the public domain. 1
75
In a handful of cases, the Supreme Court has itself made
some reference to presidential intent in the context of executive
orders or other presidential directives. In Old Dominion v. Aus-
tin, 176 for example, the Supreme Court held, referencing state-
171 Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1975); see
also John E. Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential Intent, and Private Rights of
Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 837, 867-70 (1981) (arguing, as relevant here, that where
Congress delegates to the President the authority to create a private right of
action, courts appropriately inquire into presidential intent, though such inquiry
should be secondary to considerations of congressional intent).
172 See, e.g., E.O. 13,768, supra note 2, at 8658 ("This order is not intended to,
and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at
law or in equity by any party against the United States, Its departments, agencies,
or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.").
173 United States v. Ehsan, 163 F.3d 855, 859 (4th Cir. 1998).
174 Id. (citing Message to the Congress on Iran, 31 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc.
1584 (Sept. 18, 1995)).
175 Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1419 (10th
Cir. 1990).
176 418 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1974).
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ments made by the President and other executive-branch
officials, that "one of the primary purposes of the Executive
Order was to 'substantially strengthen the Federal labor rela-
tions system by bringing it more into line with practices in the
private sector of the economy,'" and that "[iun light of this basic
purpose, we see nothing in the Executive Order which indicates
that it intended to restrict . . . the robust debate which has
been protected under the NLRA." 177 In Cappaert v. United
States, the Court explained that "[iun determining whether
there is a federally reserved water right ... the issue is whether
the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus
available water,"'78 and found that "the 1952 [Presidential]
Proclamation expressed an intention to reserve unappropriated
water."' 79 It then explained that "[i]ntent is inferred if the pre-
viously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the
purposes for which the reservation was created,"'8 0 suggesting
a purposivist approach akin to that used by courts in many
statutory-interpretation cases. And in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians,'I' the Court applied its statutory
severability standards to an Executive Order, asking "whether
the President would not have revoked the 1837 Treaty privi-
leges if he could not issue the removal order." The Court was
quite explicit, however, that it was merely assuming arguendo
that "the severability standard for statutes also applies to Exec-
utive Orders" 8 2-and the statutory standard turns on con-
gressional intent. 183
Beyond these scattered examples, and several others,18 4
federal courts have typically not grappled with presidential in-
177 Id. (quoting Announcement of the Signing of Executive Order 11,491, 5
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1508 (Oct. 29, 1969)).
178 426 U.S. 128, 139 (1976).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999).
182 Id.
183 See In rePetition of Reyes, 910 F.2d 611, 613 (9th Cir. 1990) ("This sugges-
tion coupled with the language of the Order renders it apparent that the President
would not have signed this Order had he known it would encompass those aliens
serving in the military in other geographical locations unrelated to the Grenada
invasion," and therefore the entire Order should be deemed invalid based on an
invalid provision); see also Erica Newland, Note, Executive Orders in Court, 124
YALE L.J. 2026, 2069-71 (2015) ("[Wlhile courts often seek to effectuate (some
version ol congressional intent when interpreting statutes, their guiding principle
when interpreting executive orders . . . has generally been to give effect to presi-
dential intent." (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
184 See, e.g., Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 235-36 (8th
Cir. 1975) ("[Iln our view, Executive Order No. 11821 was intended primarily as a
managerial tool for implementing the President's personal economic policies and
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tent in the context of construing executive orders-and this
fact alone is striking. Courts consider challenges to executive
orders with some frequencyl-5-including in canonical cases
like Youngstown'86-and yet they typically do not explicitly en-
gage with the President's intent in resolving challenges to those
orders.
2. Commentary
The administrative-law literature, while focusing on both
structural and functional dimensions of the relationship be-
tween the President and administrative agencies, has paid
scant attention to questions of presidential intent. The canoni-
cal Presidential Administration, by then-Professor Elena Kagan,
both identifies and celebrates a shift toward presidential con-
trol over, and rhetorical appropriation of, the output of regula-
tory processes.187 The piece engages with the President's
exercise of authority over the administrative state; but
throughout, it steers clear of probing the intent or mental
processes of President Clinton or any other President. Con-
sider the paper's lengthy discussion of President Clinton's ex-
ecutive order regarding OMB regulatory review. 188 The article
offers a close reading of a number of provisions of the executive
order's text; describes the interactions between the order's pro-
visions; and identifies areas of continuity with, and breaks
from, the regulatory review paradigms that preceded it. 189 But
there is not so much as a whisper regarding the President's
intent. Kathryn Watts, in a recent piece that continues chart-
ing the trajectory identified in Presidential Administration, fo-
cuses on the mechanisms by which outright direction or softer
types of presidential influence may be brought to bear on agen-
cies, but similarly focuses on text and conduct, not intent. 190
not as a legal framework enforceable by private civil action.... [We conclude that
the President did not undertake or intend to create any role for the judiciary in the
implementation of Executive Order No. 11821."); Mobley v. C.I.A., 924 F. Supp. 2d
24, 58 (D.D.C. 2013), affd, 806 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("Absent any affirmative
evidence that the Executive Order intended to prohibit delegation of the authority
to perform this document-by-document classification, the delegation is presump-
tively permissible."); Grove, supra note 168 (collecting cases).
185 Newland, supra note 183, at 2047.
186 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
187 Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2247-50
(2001).
188 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
189 Kagan, supra note 187, at 2285-90.




There is much more literature in this vein. 191 But the basic
point is that all of this work focuses very closely on the relation-
ship of the President to the administrative state, but never
engages in the sort of inquiry into intent that we have encoun-
tered in both the constitutional law domain, and in some of the
administrative-law cases involving intent and subordinate fed-
eral officials. As I argue in the next section, this de-emphasis of
intent is perfectly appropriate in the context of construction of
presidential instruments, at least where no constitutional vio-
lation is alleged.
B. Analogies
1. Legislative History and Legislative Intent
Part I surveyed the key debates surrounding both legisla-
tive intent and legislative history. In the context of the Presi-
dent, there are two distinct ways that intent, and statements as
evidence of that intent, might be relevant in legal contests that
do not involve constitutional claims: first, in the context of the
interpretation of legislation; and second, in the context of the
interpretation of presidential directives, like executive orders.
Before turning to presidential directives, I briefly consider pres-
idential speech and presidential intent in the context of
legislation.
Presidential statements have not always received adequate
scholarly attention in legislative-history debates.19 2 But the
President's role in the legislative process goes well beyond sign-
191 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 704-05 (2007) (arguing that the
President's role in relation to administrative agencies created by Congress "is that
of overseer and not decider"); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's
Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2583 (2006) (arguing that "the
executive's law-interpreting authority is a natural and proper outgrowth of... the
shift from regulation through common law courts to regulation through adminis-
trative agencies").
192 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation. 129 HARV. L. REV.
2118, 2125 (2016) (reviewing KATZMANN, supra note 31) ("Lawyers, academics, and
judges too often treat legislation as a one-body process ('the Congress') or a two-
body process ('the House and Senate'). But formally and functionally, it is actu-
ally a three-body process: the House, the Senate, and the President. Any theory of
statutory interpretation that seeks to account for the realities of the legislative
process ... must likewise take full account of the realities of the President's role in
the legislative process."); see also Christopher S. Yoo, Presidential Signing State-
ments: A New Perspective, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 1801, 1804 (2016) (proposing an
"equal dignity principle" counseling "that both presidential and congressional
legislative history be treated the same"); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Edward H. Stiglitz &
Barry R. Weingast, Executive Opportunism, Presidential Signing Statements, and
the Separation of Powers, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 95, 97 (2016) (suggesting that
presidential signing statements "change the meaning of an act").
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ing or vetoing legislation. The Constitution's Recommendation
Clause imposes on the President the obligation to recommend
legislation to Congress;193 so, where bills are drafted in the
executive branch or with significant involvement by executive-
branch officials, there is an argument that statements by the
President should be deemed especially relevant strains of legis-
lative history. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the President "may initiate and influence legislative propos-
als,"19 4 and the Court has cited presidential statements in ca-
nonical statutory interpretation cases. 19 5 As a general matter,
textualist critiques of legislative history would seem to have
less force in the context of presidential statements about legis-
lation, where no multimember body problems are present, and
where the Recommendation Clause may provide a constitu-
tional basis for some consideration of presidential statements,
since the constitutional language "recommend to their Consid-
193 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall from time to time ... recom-
mend to [Congress's] Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient... "); see also J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77
GEO. L.J. 2079, 2081 (1989) (arguing that "the Framers explicitly elevated the
President's recommendation of measures from a political prerogative to a consti-
tutional duty").
194 Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998); see also Martin S. Flaherty,
The Most Dangerous Branch 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1818-19 (1996) ("[The President
has aptly been termed the 'legislator-in-chief."); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of
Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 103-04 (2015) ("Despite the conventional
understanding of Congress as the primary source of legislation, often, the execu-
tive branch will draft entire pieces of legislation and transmit that legislation to
Congress."); Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67
STAN. L. REv. 999, 1044-45 (2015) (finding that agency rule drafters rated presi-
dential signing statements as being on par with both floor statements by sponsors
and hearing transcripts in terms of reliability).
195 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979) (citing
remarks of Senator Humphrey, and noting that they echoed "President Kennedy's
original message to Congress upon the introduction of the Civil Rights Act in
1963[:] There is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be admitted to
hotels and restaurants if he has no cash in his pocket and no job'" (quoting 109
CONG. REC. 11,074, 11,159 (1963))); cf. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 47-48,
(Conn. 2015) ('Turning our attention to the other elected branch of government,
we also recognize that the meaning of a statute is revealed not only in the intent of
the legislators who draft and enact it, but also in the aspirations of the governor
who signs it."); Burgos v. State, 118 A.3d 270, 283 (N.J. 2015) (finding that "the
Legislature and Governor clearly expressed an intent that Chapter 78 create a
'contract right'" but lacked the authority to do so); Treasurer & Receiver Gen. v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d 1376, 1383-84 (Mass. 1983) ("The
Governor's remarks clearly indicate that nonfiduciaries, such as insurers, were to
be included within the scope of the act .... We cannot assume the Legislature
ignored the Governor's request for broad legislation or limited the Governor's
request in a statute passed shortly after his message, without expressing any
limitations it imposed.").
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eration"196 seems to contemplate at least some sort of inter-
branch dialogue, in addition to whatever legislation might re-
sult from the presidential proposal. 197 But there is something
of a paradox here; while the President in many ways "speak[s]
for the only branch that can be said to have a single will,"
1 98 he
often does so in exceedingly informal contexts and platforms-
Twitter of course prominent among them in 2019-that may
prove unreliable interpretive aids, especially in contrast to their
more formal legislative-branch analogues. All of this suggests
that courts may find presidential statements useful in constru-
ing statutes, but that they should remain sensitive to the for-
mat and subject matter of particular presidential statements,
as well as to the context and process of passage of particular
pieces of legislation.
The idea of presidential intent-and the use of presidential
statements-in the context of judicial review of direct presiden-
tial action, rather than legislation, is both more uncharted and
more complex.
Of the leading textualist critiques of the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation, some do and some do not
appear to apply to presidential intent, and the use of presiden-
tial statements as evidence of that intent, when it comes to
presidential directives. As discussed above, the multimember
body objection is largely inapplicable in the context of execu-
tive-branch materials. Of course, Presidents act with the assis-
tance of staff members within agencies and the White
House. 199 But as a matter of constitutional structure-in par-
196 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
197 See also Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief 44
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 10 (2002) ("Early commentators on the Constitution agreed
that the State of the Union and Recommendation Clauses are mandatory.");
Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The First Worc The President's Place in "Legisla-
tive History," 89 MICH. L. REv. 399, 404 (1990) ("The compulsory language in [the
Recommendation Clause] makes presidential proposals of legislation a duty.");
Sidak, supra note 193, at 2081 (arguing that "the Framers explicitly elevated the
President's recommendation of measures from a political prerogative to a consti-
tutional duty"). See generally Jeffrey K. Tulls, Deliberation Between Institutions, in
DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 200, 200-10 (2003) (arguing that interbranch
deliberation is an essential feature of the theory of separation of powers).
198 JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTON 38 (2017).
199 See, e.g., Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REv. 805,
822-25 (2017) (discussing the rise and role of the Office of Legal Counsel in White
House decision making); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regu-
latory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 227, 234-41 (2016) (explaining that agency decisions are shaped by a group
of government officials including agency leaders and civil servants).
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ticular both the Vesting Clause20 0 and the Take Care
Clause2 0 -only the intent of the President would seem poten-
tially relevant when direct presidential action is at issue
(though the picture is more complicated when action by a
subordinate federal executive-branch official is in question).
Similarly, presidential utterances in various fora, though their
relevance may be debated, are not ordinarily subject to manip-
ulation of the sort that may be present in the case of legislative
history, where the paradigmatic example is of a staffer smug-
gling language into a committee report at the behest of a lobby-
ist 2 02-and where members may never even read reports before
they are fmalized.203
The constitutional objections to the use of legislative his-
tory-that it undermines constitutional processes of bicamera-
lism and presentment, as well as representing a questionable
delegation2 4-seem to lack any real force in the context of
direct presidential action. This is because in contrast to the
legislative process, there is ordinarily no constitutionally pre-
scribed process at all when it comes to executive action-exec-
utive orders, for example, do not so much as appear in the
Constitution. Accordingly, there is no constitutional process
that would be undermined or threatened by looking to intent,
or using extrinsic sources to divine it, in the context of these
modes of executive action. So none of the constitutional objec-
tions to the use of legislative history seem to apply to the use of
presidential statements to interpret direct presidential action.
Arguments against the use of legislative history that are
grounded in concerns regarding the judicial role may have
some force in the context of the executive, especially because
the universe of potentially relevant statements in the case of a
figure like the President is virtually boundless. Contemporary
Presidents are widely understood to "have a duty constantly to
200 U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.").
201 U.S. CONST. art II, § 3 ("[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed .... ").
202 See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her
citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land
203 But see Stipulation at 3, Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump. 302
F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17-cv-5205), https://knightcolumbia.org/
sites/ default/files /content/ Cases /Twitter/20 17.09.25%2OStipulation. pdf
[https://perma.cc/33B9-SK241 (stipulating that White House Social Media Direc-
tor Daniel Scavino sometimes posts messages on behalf of President Donald
Trump).
204 See supra Part II.
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defend themselves publicly, to promote policy initiatives na-
tionwide, and to inspirit the population.'" 20
5 To allow courts to
selectively utilize casual presidential utterances as interpretive
guides when it comes to presidential orders would render such
use susceptible to just the sort of cherry-picking critique that
opponents of legislative history have been able to marshal with
considerable force in the statutory-interpretation context. In-
deed, this was one of Judge Kozinski's key objections to both a
district court order and Ninth Circuit panel opinion invalidat-
ing President Trump's first travel ban executive order. As he
wrote, "[clandidates say many things on the campaign trail;
they are often contradictory or inflammatory. No shortage of
dark purpose can be found sifting through the daily promises
of a drowning candidate, when in truth the poor schlub's only
intention is to get elected."20 6 Although Kozinski's focus here
was on campaign statements, the argument readily translates
to Presidents today, with the high volume of speeches and
other statements they customarily give207-particularly in a
world in which, as President Donald Trump told reporters one
month into his administration, "Life is a campaign.... Making
our country great again is a campaign. For me, it's a
campaign."2 08
So parts of the textualist case against legislative history
seem to hold up in the context of the President, and some do
not. But beyond these comparisons to legislative history de-
bates, a number of additional considerations counsel against
the use of presidential statements when it comes to the ordi-
nary interpretation of presidential instruments. First, the Con-
stitution itself supplies some support for distinguishing
between the use of such materials in the context of the legisla-
ture, on the one hand, and the executive, on the other. Article I,
Section 5, provides that each House of Congress will "deter-
mine the rules of its proceedings," and additionally that "each
House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to
205 JEFFERY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 4 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
206 Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (footnote omitted).
207 But see Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd-Do More Interpretive
Sources Mean More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 558 (2017) (challenging
"the notion that discretion increases as sources increase").
208 Lindsey Bever, 'Demonic Activity was Palpable' at Trump's Rally, Pastor
Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-
of-faith/wp/2017/02/22/demonic-activlty-palpable-at-president-trumps-rallY-
pastor- says/?tid=smfb&utmterm=. e09de89c9308 [https: //perma.cc/2CUF-
5HLTI.
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time publish the same[.1"20 9 This language, as both Victoria
Nourse and Jim Brudney have argued, is tantamount to a con-
stitutional mandate to consider-or at least constitutional
grounding for considering-"legislative evidence," or what we
more commonly refer to as legislative history.2 10 In addition to
this constitutional grounding, long-standing norms and prac-
tices have resulted in a degree of openness and public debate
when it comes to congressional processes.2 11 While no one is
naive enough to think that everything of relevance to a bill's
passage appears in the Congressional Record, or in front of the
cameras, these transparency requirements and practices nev-
ertheless ensure that a degree of transparency attaches to the
legislative process.
By contrast, nothing in the Constitution specifically re-
quires any degree of public access to White House materials or
decision-making processes. Of course, nothing in the docu-
ment expressly protects White House secrecy either2 12 ; but
other founding-era documents contemplate some executive-
branch secrecy,2 13 and consistent practice since the founding
has created a strong norm in favor of at least a degree of execu-
tive-branch secrecy.2 14
209 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
210 See NOURSE, supra note 45, at 163 ("[T]he Proceedings Clause gives explicit
authority to the 'proceedings' of each house, the proceedings documented in a
constitutionally prescribed legislative journal. Because of that specific constitu-
tional authority, legislative evidence should be given more, not less, constitutional
weight than other materials." (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)); James J.
Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets,
98 CALIF. L. REv. 1199, 1201 (2010) (describing Article I as having created "two
notable innovations in legislative design that are relevant to how courts should
approach statutory interpretation[:] . . . the determination to favor detailed public
reporting of floor debates and the decision to create permanent standing commit-
tees that produced oral and then written committee reports").
211 See, e.g., STEPHEN FRANTZICH & JOHN SULLIVAN, THE C-SPAN REVOLUTION
55-60 (1996) (describing debates on utilizing television to increase public access
to political decision making).
212 See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive
Privilege Revisited, 92 IowA L. REv. 489, 520-21 (2007); DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOV-
ERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1981).
213 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Presidential "unity is
conducive to energy" because "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and d[ilspatch will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree
than the proceedings of any greater number").
214 See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REv. 257, 267 (2010); see
also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) ("Nowhere in the Constitu-
tion . . . is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the




Presidential statements, especially those made using plat-
forms like Twitter or during informal speeches and interviews,
also fall short of the degree of preparation and care that often
attend committee reports, widely viewed as the most reliable
form of legislative history. In addition, as I have argued else-
where, courts faced with presidential statements as potential
interpretive guides are likely simultaneously to encounter exec-
utive-branch positions offered in other, more authoritative doc-
uments-typically briefs filed by the Department of Justice.
2 15
In such instances, the values of process and rigor suggest hat
those documents, rather than presidential statements, should
be treated as containing the authoritative statements of the
position of the executive branch on a legal question-in partic-
ular if there is tension between the two on matters of
interpretation. 
2 1 6
Even if courts thought presidential statements might illu-
minate the meaning of a presidential enactment, the relative
ease of correction of presidential directives would seem to sup-
ply an additional reason for courts to refrain from probing pres-
idential intent, in light of the arguments counseling against
their use. In contrast to the complex and difficult process of
passage of legislation to correct judicial interpretations, modi-
fying an executive order is quite literally achieved with the
stroke of a pen.
2 17
In addition, there is arguably an important distinction be-
tween presidential statements made via Twitter and in
speeches and other fora, and presidential instruments like ex-
ecutive orders: the statements made by a particular President
are irreducibly tied to that particular President. By contrast,
presidential instruments like executive orders, which remain in
215 See Shaw, supra note 3, at 123: Tulis, supra note 197, at 200-01 ("In the
construction and exchange of texts institutions address the merits of public policy
and the best of these exchanges manifest the most important attribute of delibera-
tion: reciprocal respect for, and responsiveness to, opposing arguments regarding
the issue addressed.").
216 See Shaw, supra note 3, at 131.
217 See MAYER, supra note 169, at 4-5; Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power
in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 994 (2003) ("Executive orders are ... freely
revocable and revisable .... ."). For literature on congressional overrides of judi-
cial decisions, see Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congres-
sional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011,
92 TEX. L. REv. 1317, 1317 (2014); Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and
the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 511, 511 (2009).
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effect unless and until a later President undoes them, can be
viewed as products of the institution of the presidency.2 18
The discussion in this subpart suggests that although
presidential intent, and extrinsic materials as evidence of that
intent, may be an appropriate component of an inquiry into the
meaning of a statute, in particular a statute whose drafting
process involved significant White House involvement, there is
reason for caution about inquiries into intent, and reliance on
certain sorts of extrinsic materials that might go to intent, in
the context of executive action-at least where the judicial in-
quiry in question is not one in which any constitutionally im-
permissible intent is alleged.
2. Ordinary Administrative Law
Foundational principles of administrative law similarly
counsel against relying on presidential statements to illumi-
nate the meaning of presidential action; in fact, there may be
more reason for caution in the context of interpretation of pres-
idential actions than agency actions.
As discussed above, much of administrative law attends to
the explanations given, and materials relied upon, by agency
actors engaged in policymaking, discouraging courts from
looking outside agency processes to assess agency action. Che-
nery v. SEC most famously holds that agency action can only
be upheld on the basis of reasons that were given by the agency
at the time it took the action under review.2 19 This stands in
contrast to lower court judgments, which can be affirmed on
any basis (assuming arguments have been preserved).220 In
addition, the Court in cases like Morgan and Overton Park has
erected a high (though not insurmountable) hurdle to inquiring
into the intentions of agency actors, at least where some sort of
contemporaneous explanation for agency action was
provided.22
1
218 See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article H, 131 HARV. L. REV.
2187, 2221-22 (2018). Indeed, the publication norms around presidential direc-
tives like memoranda in the Federal Register, and the norm against publication
even of presidential speeches of comparative formality, like State of the Union
addresses, reflects our understanding of the enduring force of directives like
memoranda. See also Shaw, supra note 3, at 77 n. 15 (discussing publication
practices around the presidency).
219 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 194 (1947).
220 Id.; Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 156
(1962).




These principles may not apply directly to the President,
since the Court has suggested that presidential action is not
subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act
2 2 2
(though some of these principles predate and perhaps tran-
scend the APA). And it is not clear how the political accounta-
bility concerns that may explain Chenery translate to the
context of the President, who of course is politically accounta-
ble in a way agencies are not.
223
But there may be related but independent reasons to hesi-
tate before probing intent in the mine-run of cases involving
the President. Presidential action occurs free from the access
and transparency requirements that attach to agency action.
Franklin v. Massachusetts exempts presidential action from the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act,224 with its
robust public participation provisions, and courts have held
that the Freedom of Information Act is not applicable to the
White House.225 All of this means that courts encountering
presidential directives do so without access to much in the way
of decisional history,22 6 in ways that differ both practically and
constitutionally from not only congressional but also agency
products. So the invocation of isolated presidential statements
seems unlikely to give the full picture of any decisional process
in the case of presidential action. Selective citation, then, is
unlikely to provide reliable insight into the proper interpreta-
tion of a presidential directive.
C. Scope, Meaning, and Constitutionality
The analogies to both legislation and agency action, then,
counsel against inquiring into presidential intent in the course
of construing presidential directives. But when it comes to
constitutional claims, there are strong arguments, both practi-
222 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992); Dalton v. Specter,
511 U.S. 462, 469 (1994) ("[Tihe President's actions [alre not reviewable under the
APA, because the President is not an 'agency' within the meaning of the APA.").
223 See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE
L.J. 952, 1016 (2007). Note, however, that Stack actually argues that Chenery's
reason-giving requirement does apply to the President.
224 Franklin, 505 U.S. at 801 ("As the APA does not expressly allow review of
the President's actions, we must presume that his actions are not subject to its
requirements.").
225 See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136,
156 (1980) (records made by the National Security Advisor not subject to FOIA).
226 Where agencies have been intimately involved with the drafting of a presi-
dential directive, as is often the case with either the Office of Legal Counsel or the
Office of Management and Budget, FOIA Is theoretically available, but a number of
bases for withholding relevant documents means that release is unlikely.
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cal and conceptual, for inquiring into presidential intent and
for using presidential statements as evidence of that intent.
As shown in Parts I and II, courts have long inquired into
the intentions of government actors in constitutional cases;
and, absent some principled, Article II-grounded reason for dis-
tinguishing the President from other government actors when it
comes to the relevance of intent, it may simply follow that pres-
idential intent is no less relevant than the intent of any other
actor. Of course, the deference courts extend to the President
in the context of foreign affairs and national security matters
may mean that such cases should be treated somewhat differ-
ently.2 2 7 Still, as Professor Micah Schwartzman recently ex-
plained, various conceptions of political legitimacy render
official intentions relevant, both directly ("intentions might be
relevant because the moral principles and ideals that are ac-
ceptable to reasonable citizens, and which are used to struc-
ture constitutional essentials, may include limits on how
public officials can be motivated") and indirectly (in the case of
the travel ban, "because, when publicly conveyed, they demean
or denigrate religious minorities in ways that are impermissi-
ble").2 2 8 On the logic of both direct and indirect relevance, the
intentions of the President, who is selected, if indirectly, by the
polity as a whole, seem if anything more potentially relevant
than the intentions of any other government official.
As Professor Schwartzman also suggests, as an epistemic
matter there is nothing particularly distinctive or difficult
about ascertaining presidential intent. Courts can simply ap-
ply familiar constitutional tests, inquiring into the history and
public discourse surrounding the decision under review, in-
cluding statements made around the decision, as well as the
"specific sequence of events leading up the challenged deci-
sion. "229 Indeed, the constitutionally-inflected administrative
227 How much deference courts actually give the President in matters of for-
eign relations and national security is the subject of active debate. See Deborah
N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 785 (2011) (challenging the prevailing account that
"the Court will defer to executive views in core matters of foreign relations").
228 Schwartzman, supra note 25, at 210-12.
229 ViI. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268
(1977); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (plurality opinion) ("In determining if the object of a law is a
neutral one," a court should look to evidence that includes "the historical back-
ground of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the
enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative his-
tory, including contemporaneous tatements made by members of the decision-
making body").
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law cases discussed above demonstrate courts doing just that
in the context of evaluating the motives of executive-branch
actors other than the President.
At this point, it is worth revisiting a significant aside from
the Arlington Heights opinion. The Arlington Heights Court pro-
vided critical guidance regarding how courts were to approach
the intent inquiry in constitutional cases. But the Court also
suggested that privilege might circumscribe courts' ability to
conduct such inquiries, or at least limit their ability to elicit
testimony from government officials that might go to intent.230
Presumably, the Court had in mind some version of legisla-
tive immunity, of which there are a number of forms. In the
Constitution, the Speech or Debate Clause provides that "for
any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Repre-
sentatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."23 1 The
provision has been understood to grant legislative-branch offi-
cials immunity from criminal and civil prosecution for actions
within the sphere of legislative activity.2 32 Although the protec-
tion is not unlimited-some judicial opinions actually take a
narrow view of the scope of privileged activity23 3-the clause
itself remains an illustration of the inviolability of at least some
of the rhetorical activities of members of Congress.234
230 VIL of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 ("[M]embers [of such bodies]
might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official
action," though "such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege").
231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
232 See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975);
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1973); United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501, 516 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502-03 (1969); see
also Michael L. Shenkman, Talking About Speech or Debate: Revisiting Legislative
Irrununity, 32 YALE L. & POLY REV. 351, 371-84 (2014) (explaining the Immunity
the provision is understood to provide).
233 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130-32 (1979) (permitting law-
suit against Senator based on materials he distributed outside of the legislature,
on the grounds that "neither the newsletters nor the press release was 'essential
to the deliberations of the Senate' and neither was part of the deliberative pro-
cess"); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625-26 (1972) (concluding that
Senator Gravel's activities surrounding publication of the Pentagon Papers were
"not part and parcel of the legislative process" and thus not covered by the Speech
or Debate Clause); CHAFETZ, supra note 198, at 229 (critiquing the Court's unduly
narrow vision of the clause, and arguing: "real legislative authority is, in fact,
largely constructed through the processes of public engagement, and the Speech
or Debate Clause ought to be understood to facilitate those processes"); see also
JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY'S PRIVILEGED FEw: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC
NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 95 (2007).
234 Most state constitutions have provisions similar to the federal Constitu-
tion's Speech or Debate Clause. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 11 ("For any
speech or debate in either house of the legislature, the members shall not be
questioned in any other place."); see also Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value
of the Legislative Privilege n State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 224
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In light of this context, it is striking that no analogous
privilege extends-or has ever been understood to extend-to
the executive, in particular the President. Neither common law
tradition nor constitutional provision shields speech by the Ex-
ecutive from potential later use in courts and other fora, as is
the case with at least some legislative speech (although non-
public debate and deliberation involving the President may cer-
tainly be subject to claims of executive privilege235). This dis-
tinction may shore up the case for the propriety of considering
presidential intent, particularly where public statements ap-
pear to go to intent. Indeed, the divergent language in Article II
compared to Article I may provide an affirmative constitutional
warrant for considering presidential statements and presiden-
tial intent in constitutional cases.
236
Of course, whatever the identity of the government official,
not all utterances will necessarily be relevant in constitutional
cases, even where the speech touches subject matter that
could implicate constitutional protections. Indeed, as Justice
Stevens has noted in the context of the Establishment Clause,
there will be some instances in which government officials'
statements are not even properly attributable to government as
such. Writing of the practice of offering a short prayer or bless-
ing in the context of a public address, he explained that "when
public officials deliver public speeches, we recognize that their
words are not exclusively a transmission from the government
because those oratories have embedded within them the inher-
ently personal views of the speaker as an individual member of
the polity."2 37 In the cases that are my focus here, however,
official speech touches on the subject of official action in ways
(2003) (identifying forty-three state constitutions containing similar provisions).
And common law protections may exist even in states that have not constitution-
alized the protection. State speech-or-debate protections are generally under-
stood to sweep less broadly than the federal version, but like the federal clause,
they provide robust-even absolute-protections to speech made in conjunction
with core legislative activities. Id. ("In a number of recent cases, state courts have
construed the absolute privilege that attaches to a legislator's work more narrowly
than federal courts have interpreted the corresponding privilege found in the U.S.
Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause." (footnote omitted)).
235 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686 (1974).
236 I should note that I do not explore presidential immunity from suit gener-
ally-merely the absence of a sort of presidential immunity akin to legislative
immunity. For a recent discussion of presidential immunity more broadly, see
Steve Vladeck & Benjamin Wittes, Can A President's Absolute Immunity Be
Trumped?, LAwFARE (May 9, 2017, 5:17 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-
presidents-absolute-immunity-be-trumped [https: //perma.cc/QY8J-MV9P].
237 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 723 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause,
89 TEx. L. REv. 583, 588 (2011).
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that render reliance far more appropriate than in Justice Ste-
vens' hypothetical.
One case in which the absence of any discussion of presi-
dential (or other officials') intent is especially conspicuous is
Korematsu v. United States.2 38 In that case, the Court failed to
inquire into intent-either of President Roosevelt, whose execu-
tive order authorized the military to exclude groups or persons
from designated areas,2 39 or of General DeWitt, who issued the
exclusion order pursuant to which Fred Korematsu was ar-
rested.240 Instead, the Court credited the government's prof-
fered military necessity rationale-that "exclusion of those of
Japanese origin was deemed necessary because of the pres-
ence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the
group... the military authorities considered that the need for
action was great, and time was short"2 4 1-and looked no fur-
ther into official purpose.
The Court was presented with arguments that it should
look behind the government's representations of necessity.
Korematsu's brief contended that the order was animated by
racial prejudice,24 2 and it quoted at length from the report of
General DeWitt on which the government largely relied:
What one day will be celebrated as a masterpiece of illogic but
which is corroborative evidence this frenzied banishment was
based upon prejudice appears in General DeWitt's letter of
February 14, 1942, to the Secretary of War, one month and a
half before the evacuation commenced. He characterizes all
our Japanese as subversive in this letter by referring to the
subject of "Evacuation of Japanese and other Subversive Per-
sons from the Pacific Coast." He states in the context thereof
that "the Japanese race is an enemy race" and the native-
born are citizens and "Americanized", their "racial strains are
238 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
239 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
240 Civilian Exclusion Order No. 43, 7 Fed. Reg. 3967 (May 3, 1942).
241 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-24.
242 In the words of the brief:
These quiet citizens, thousands of whose sons were in uniform,
suffered the agonies of war and, along with their families, these
insults and humiliations and, finally, the embarrassment of banish-
ment and imprisonment, all because of the color of their skin, the
slant of their eyes, the religions they professed and the old national-
ity of a few of their forebears.
Brief for Appellant at 10-12, Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), 1944 WL
42849.
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undiluted" and being "barred from assimilation by conven-
tion" may "turn against this nation. "243
The Korematsu majority made no mention of this report, but
several of the dissenting opinions did. The dissent of Justice
Murphy in particular argued that the exclusion order "goes
over the very brink of constitutional power and falls into the
ugly abyss of racism, "244 pointing to General DeWitt's report as
evidence that "this forced exclusion was the result in good mea-
sure of this erroneous assumption of racial guilt rather than
bona fide military necessity."245
Of course, Korematsu is subject to nearly universal con-
demnation today.246 Some of the criticism focuses on the fail-
ure of the executive branch to provide truthful information to
243 Id. at 63 (citation omitted). Indeed, evidence that came to light much later
revealed that this report was a revised version of an earlier report that reflected
even more extensive bias and animus on the part of General DeWitt. See Jerry
Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REv. 933,
977 (2004).
244 The dissent continues:
That this forced exclusion was the result in good measure of this
erroneous assumption of racial guilt rather than bona fide military
necessity is evidenced by the Commanding General's Final Report
on the evacuation from the Pacific Coast area. In it he refers to all
individuals of Japanese descent as "subversive," as belonging to "an
enemy race" whose "racial strains are undiluted," and as constitut-
ing "over 112,000 potential enemies.. . at large today" along the
Pacific Coast.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); Id. at
235-36 (footnote omitted).
245 Id. Noah Feldman suggests that "at the time [Hirabayashi] was decided,
Murphy had already been concerned about the racial motivation of the detention,
but allowed his dissent to become a concurrence. Now he decided the time was
right to make a stand." NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF
FDR'S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 249 (2010).
246 Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 396 (2011) (including
Korematsu in the "anticanon," that is, a "decision [that] has been rejected by our
legal culture"); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) ("Kore-
matsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court
of history, and-to be clear-'has no place in law under the Constitution.'" (quot-
ing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting))); Korematsu v. United
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419-20 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting writ of coram
nobis); NEAL KATYAL, ACTING SoIuc. GEN., DEP'T OF JUST., Confession of Error: The
Solicitor General's Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases (May
20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solici-
tor-generals-mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases [https://per
ma.cc/PG9D-4KGL; Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts,
Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Conm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 241 (2005) (agreeing with characterization of Korematsu
as ranking among "some of the worst decisions in the history of the Supreme
Court").
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the Court.2 4 7 And the case is somewhat distinct from my main
focus here, in that the most potentially relevant statements
came not from the President but a subordinate executive-
branch official. But the Court's total failure to inquire into
intent, in the context of accepting the government's attestation
of military necessity, is a deep current within the case.2 4 8 And
it supplies support for the position that, at least under some
circumstances, judicial failure to probe official intent can re-
sult in profoundly misguided results.
D. Application
The foregoing discussion, I hope, establishes that there are
good reasons for inquiring into the intentions or motives of the
President in the context of constitutional claims. The justifica-
tions for doing so are straightforward: we have placed substan-
tive limits on the permissible intentions or motivations of
government officials, and those limits reflect certain constitu-
tional principles and ideals: equality; freedom of religion; the
impermissibility of government action designed to target indi-
viduals based on their membership in particular groups, or to
punish speech for its content or views. Nothing in either the
text or contemporary understandings of Article II grants the
President an exemption from these generally applicable
principles.
Against this backdrop, let us return to the examples de-
scribed in the Introduction.
1. Travel Ban
Consider, first, the twin questions of the relevance of presi-
dential intent to the constitutionality of the President's "travel
ban" executive orders" and the significance of the President's
statements (as both chief executive and earlier as presidential
candidate) for courts confronting challenges to the successive
directives. The legal questions surrounding the first iteration
of the travel ban-issued one week into the new administra-
tion, enjoined by multiple courts, and eventually withdrawn
and replaced by a second and then third version of the ban-
247 See Kang, supra note 242, at 977; Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of
Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 AsIAN PAC. AM. L.J.
72, 74 (1996).
248 See Leah Litman & Ian Samuel, No Peeking? Korematsu and Judicial Cre-
dulity, TAKE CARE (Mar. 22, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/no-peeking-ko
rematsu-and-judicial-credulity [https: //perma.cc/YH7C-3JY7].
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provide the clearest illustration of the distinctions offered
above.
The first ban was challenged on several constitutional
grounds, including the Establishment Clause (on the basis that
it disfavored Muslims) and the Due Process Clause (on the
grounds that it operated to deprive some individuals of pro-
tected interests without notice or a hearing).249 The Court also
faced questions regarding the scope and operation of the order
in several respects, including whether it extended to lawful
permanent residents, or green card holders. The White House
had purported to resolve questions about the applicability of
the order to green card holders through a memo from the White
House Counsel.25 0 But suppose instead that the President
himself had either tweeted or explained in an interview that
green card holders were not subject to the ban-an important
antecedent question to the challengers' constitutional due pro-
cess claims.
The arguments offered above suggest that such presiden-
tial statements should not have been considered in construing
the scope and reach of the order. By contrast, the presidential
statements that a number of lower courts read as evincing an
intent to discriminate against Muslims on the basis of religion
did warrant consideration by courts deciding whether the or-
ders were infected by constitutionally impermissible intent.
The Establishment Clause, as the cases discussed in Part I
make clear, is quite concerned with the intent of government
actors, and the most relevant actor here is the President. Ac-
cordingly, it was appropriate for courts to consider statements
made by the President, where those statements went to intent.
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit opinion invalidating the third
iteration of the travel ban focused on both the President's pur-
pose and his statements. In upholding a preliminary injunction
that court explained:
Plaintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President of the
United States has openly and often expressed his desire to
ban those of Islamic faith from entering the United States.
The Proclamation is thus not only a likely Establishment
Clause violation, but also strikes at the basic notion that the
government may not act based on "religious animosity."25 1
249 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164-67 (9th Cir. 2017).
250 COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, AUTHORITATIVE GUIDANCE ON EXECUTIVE ORDER
ENTITLED "PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE UNITED
STATES" (Jan. 27, 2017).
251 Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 269 (4th Cir.
2018), as amended (Feb. 28, 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct.
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The Supreme Court ultimately rejected this Establishment
Clause argument-as well as several statutory challenges to
the Proclamation-largely setting aside the presidential state-
ments relied upon by the Fourth Circuit. The Court did not,
however, fully close the door to such statements, relying in part
on a concession by the Solicitor General that under some cir-
cumstances, when there is compelling enough evidence of ani-
mus, the Court need not limit its inquiry to the facial validity of
a presidential directive.
2 52
A moment at oral argument before the Supreme Court in
Trump v. Hawaii precisely illustrates the distinction between
meaning and constitutionality set forth above. In his rebuttal,
Solicitor General Noel Francisco explained that "the [presiden-
tial] statements that [the plaintiffs] principally rely on don't
actually address the meaning of the proclamation itself. This is
not a so-called Muslim ban. If it were, it would be the most
ineffective Muslim ban that one could possibly imagine."
253
But that response suggested that the President's words did
not establish what the Proclamation meant or did-they did not
convert a country-specific set of travel restrictions into an ac-
tual ban on Muslims entering the United States. And, as I have
argued here, Solicitor General Francisco's argument against
relying upon the President's words to assess the scope or
meaning of the Proclamation was well-grounded. But Fran-
cisco did not squarely confront the potential use of the Presi-
dent's words as evidence of presidential intent. Indeed,
nothing in Francisco's rebuttal provided any convincing rea-
sons not to consider the statements for that very different pur-
pose. So the travel ban case illustrates precisely the distinction
I propose here.
2 54
This argument also suggests that the Court erred in not
taking more seriously the President's statements; under ordi-
nary Establishment Clause doctrine, the statements should
have been deemed highly relevant. Still, it was quite significant
that the Court did not entirely close the door to the legal rele-
2710 (2018) (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye., Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 532, 535 (1993)); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433,
2439 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Taking all the relevant evidence to-
gether, a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was driven
primarily by anti-Muslim animus ... ").
252 See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418.
253 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2392 (No. 17-965).
254 Kate Shaw, The Travel Ban Arguments and the President's Words, HARv. L.
REv. BLOG (April 27, 2018), https: //blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-travel-ban-ar
guments-and-the-presidents-words/ [https: //perma.cc/LGK7-MQBJ].
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vance of presidential statements and presidential intent, even
in cases involving matters like immigration or national secur-
ity. The decision to leave that door open sends an important
message to the lower courts-that they need not reject entirely
the potential constitutional relevance of the words and intent of
the President.
2. "Sanctuary" Cities
A second example involves the litigation over President
Trump's "sanctuary cities" executive order, an order framed as
a response to municipalities that "willfully violate Federal law
in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United
States."2 55 After its issuance, the order, and subsequent im-
plementation by the Attorney General, were swiftly challenged
by several municipalities on various constitutional and statu-
tory grounds, and some of those cases remain ongoing.25 6 In
these cases, too, a major question is what the order does-
here, whether it imposes new conditions on municipalities that
receive federal funds, or merely requires localities to comply
with existing federal law. As one of the district courts consider-
ing such a challenge explained, "[tlhe Government's primary
defense is that the Order does not change the law, but merely
directs the Attorney General and Secretary [of Homeland Se-
curity] to enforce existing law."25 7 But the court chose not to
accept that characterization. It concluded, rather, based on
both the text of the order and a number of statements by the
President (as well as other executive-branch officials), that the
order did impose new conditions, and accordingly that the lo-
calities were likely to succeed in their constitutional challenge.
The statements on which the court relied included an interview
with Bill O'Reilly in which the President explained that he was
"very much opposed" to sanctuary cities and promised that "[if
we have to, we'll defund."25 8 The court also cited a press con-
ference in which Attorney General Sessions indicated that mu-
nicipalities could be subject to "withholding grants,
termination of grants, and disbarment or ineligibility for future
255 E.O. 13,768, supra note 2.
256 See Christina Goldbaum, State Courts Become Battleground Over Trump's
Sanctuary Cities Policy, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/12 / 12/nyregion/sanctuary-cities-state-courts.html [https://perma.cc/
3K22-M5L8].
257 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 514 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
258 Interview by Bill O'Reilly with Donald J. Trump, President of the United
States, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid= 123062 [https: //perma.cc/SAP5-A6T].
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grants," as well as statements by the White House Press Secre-
tary to the same effect.259 As the court explained, "[tihe state-
ments of the President, his press secretary and the Attorney
General belie the Government's argument in the briefing that
the Order does not change the law."
260
On the logic advanced here, it was arguably improper for
the court to rely on the words of the President and subordinate
officials in ruling on the operation of the executive order. As
the Parts above contend, although analogous statements by
legislators could prove useful in the construction of a piece of
legislation, and although it was surely correct to focus on the
order's text, as the court did, considerations both constitu-
tional and institutional counseled against the consideration of
presidential statements merely in order to construe the execu-
tive order under review.
3. Military Service by Transgender Individuals
Finally, the litigation surrounding the Administration's
ban on military service by transgender individuals provides an
additional illustration of the distinction I am drawing here.
26 1
The ban was initially announced via Twitter and followed by a
Presidential Memorandum to the Secretaries of Defense and
Homeland Security, directing them, among other things, to cre-
ate a process for ending the accession of transgender individu-
als into the military.26 2 A number of individuals challenged
both the order and its implementation, and the courts have
been required (the litigation is ongoing) to both interpret the
order and decide whether it complies with the requirements of
the Constitution.
263
Once again, the arguments outlined above suggest that
presidential statements, made via Twitter or elsewhere, should
not be used to interpret the scope or operation of the order. By
contrast, these statements-and potentially others that might
259 Cty. of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 520, 522.
260 Id. at 523.
261 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM),
https: //twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864 [https: //
perma.cc/RDP-DXVNI; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWIITER (July 26,
2017, 6:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313
833472 [https: //perma.cc/HB8H-XDZ6]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TW1TrER (July 26, 2017, 6:08 AM), https://twitter.com/reaDonaldTrump/status/
890197095151546369 [https: //perma.cc/52YQ-DDN5].
262 Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 82 Fed. Reg.
41,319 (Aug. 25, 2017).
263 See In Tweets, President Purports to Ban Transgender Servicemembers, 131
HARV. L. REV. 934, 936-39 (2018).
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evince animus toward transgender individuals as a group-
could properly be considered in the context of equal protection
challenges alleging that the order impermissibly discriminates
on the basis of sex or gender identity.
E. Objections and Responses
Adopting the framework set forth above means accepting
that in some instances, presidential utterances will remain off-
limits to courts evaluating presidential action. So it is neces-
sary to answer objections that courts ought to consider a wider
swath of presidential utterances.
One argument in favor of considering all presidential state-
ments is purely pragmatic-that judicial consideration of presi-
dential statements will have a salutary effect on both the
processes that produce presidential statements and the output
of those processes. On this logic, Presidents might be incen-
tivized to take more care with what they say if courts refuse to
give a pass to presidential speech. A related objection is that
for courts to place some presidential statements off-limits is
essentially to countenance official mendacity,264 permitting
Presidents to make one set of representations to the public and
another to courts without any consequences.265
But one fairly straightforward response is that the conse-
quences of government mendacity must in most instances be
political, rather than judicial. The vast majority of governmen-
tal lies and misstatements will arise in matters that never make
it before the courts to begin with. Even if courts were to bind
political actors to their representations (and misrepresenta-
tions) in a narrow swath of cases in which such representa-
tions were relevant to the resolution of a justiciable dispute,
such consequences would seem less likely to punish or deter
misrepresentations writ large than would attempts by the
press, civil society, and voters to hold Presidents and other
government actors accountable.
264 See Helen Norton, The Government's Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J.
73, 110 (2015); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 Sup. CT. REV. 161,
167.
265 This is a genuine concern in the case of a President who routinely lies or
misleads. See Glenn Kessler et al., President Trump Has Made 3,001 False or
Misleading Claims So Far, WASH. PosT, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
fact-checker/wp/2018/05/01/president-trump-has-made-3001-false-or-mis
leading-claims-so-far/?noredirect=on&utmterm=. 9ccd6ecef751 [http://perma
.cc/Z5QV-73A9] (an ongoing database of the "false or misleading claims" made by
President Trump since assuming office).
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Another potential objection to this proposal is that to credit
representations made in litigation by subordinate officials,
while disregarding statements by the President, is essentially
to flip the constitutional hierarchy on its head, in tension with
both the Vesting Clause and the basic structure of the
Constitution.
But, as I have argued elsewhere, to disregard presidential
statements in lieu of the briefs and arguments of lawyers in the
Justice Department is not to elevate the statements of
subordinate officials above those of the President: if the Presi-
dent wishes to direct his subordinates to present particular
arguments to the courts, he retains the power to do so. But the
long-standing allocation to the Justice Department of the
power to present the position of the United States to the
courts-a function of both tradition and statute-means that
courts should not permit the President to bypass these
processes completely.
2 66
Finally, it is possible to argue that courts should consider
presidential statements in an asymmetrical fashion-that is,
that courts should consider such statements only when the
President's statements run contrary to the President's pre-
ferred reading of the directive in question. Professor Glen Stas-
zewski makes a related version of this argument in an article
considering the relevance of the statements of ballot-initiative
proponents in the interpretation of ballot initiatives.
267 Profes-
sor Staszewski focuses on Michigan's Proposal 2, a ballot initi-
ative that, like many other so-called "baby DOMA" laws, was
approved by Michigan voters in November 2004.268 During the
campaign, the initiative proponents' rhetoric had suggested
that the proposal was narrow and would only impact marriage
itself. But soon after it was approved, some proponents began
arguing that the proposal swept more broadly, including to
invalidate domestic partner benefits. Staszewski's article pro-
poses a new canon of interpretation, under which courts are to
"interpret successful ballot measures in a manner that binds
the initiative proponents to their positions during the election
campaign."26 9 Applying this scheme to the President would be
challenging, but it is an intriguing possibility.
266 See Shaw, supra note 3, at 123-29.
267 Glen Staszewskl, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 Wis. L.
REV. 17, 45 (2006).
268 Id. at 45.
269 Id.; see also Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the States, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 213, 253 (2014) (pointing out that a number of courts, prior to
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An additional response to several of the objections above is
that in many or most instances, existing administrative-law
doctrines already equip courts to invalidate government action
when officials provide manufactured or ex post justifications,
and where considering presidential speech might reveal a pol-
icy's true motivations.270 Consider, as a hypothetical, an exec-
utive action that singles out a particular country, or company,
for adverse treatment-sanctions, tariffs, or entry restrictions
in the case of a country; heightened antitrust scrutiny, or ad-
verse tax treatment, in the case of a private company. In this
hypothetical, presidential statements uggest that personal an-
imosity between the President and the head of the targeted
entity is in fact responsible for the government action; but
when a legal challenge is brought, the official justifications of-
fered by government litigators point to some neutral purpose,
rather than personality clashes with the President. If, in fact,
the justifications are essentially a cover used to conceal the
policy's true justifications, then it is likely that arbitrary and
capricious review, available to assess the agency action
through which the President's directives are typically carried
out, would likely suffice to invalidate the conduct in question.
Arbitrary and capricious review demands a fit between govern-
ment action and proffered rationale,2 71 and manufactured jus-
tifications along these lines likely would and should fail such
review.
CONCLUSION
The discussion here makes several things clear. First, ex-
isting constitutional tests for establishing impermissible intent
are entirely applicable to executive-branch actors and should
be applicable to the President; those tests make plain the per-
missibility of reliance on extrinsic materials in establishing in-
tent. But a wholesale transplant of notions of "legislative
intent" to the context of the Executive is not warranted, for
reasons that in some ways overlap with, and in some ways
diverge from, critiques of legislative intent and legislative his-
tory in the context of statutory interpretation. Finally, case law
and scholarship on the question of presidential intent is ex-
2013, had "permitted ballot initiative proponents to defend laws the executive had
chosen not to defend").
270 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
419-21 (1971) (finding the Secretary of Transportation's post hoc rationalizations
for his decision to build a highway insufficient).




ceedingly limited, and what case law does exist fails to provide
much guidance-but he conspicuous failure of courts in cases
like Korematsu to probe presidential intent actually provides
further support for the view that future courts ought to be more
willing to inquire into presidential intent, at least in constitu-
tional cases. And the examples provided above illustrate in
practice the line I propose here-careful consideration of the
words of the President in constitutional adjudication, but a de-
emphasis of their significance in the context of ordinary
interpretation.
In the words of Jeffrey Tulis's masterful The Rhetorical
Presidency: "Rhetorical power is a very special case of executive
power." This is because "simultaneously it is the means by
which an executive can defend the use of ... executive powers
and.., a power itself. Rhetorical power is thus not only a form
of 'communication,' it is also a way of constituting the people to
whom it is addressed."
272
Tulis wrote these words long before President Trump ar-
rived on the scene, but it seems beyond dispute that President
Trump has broken with many rhetorical norms (as well as
other norms) that have long held sway. We do not yet know
how this use of rhetoric may impact presidential power-if
power can be understood, as Daryl Levinson recently defined it,
as "the ability of political actors to control the outcomes of
contested decisionmaking processes and secure their preferred
policies."273 But courts, unlike historians, do not have the ad-
vantage of waiting to make these sorts of assessments. They
face questions now regarding how much to look to intent, and
whether to rely on statements made via Twitter, or at rallies or
in interviews, in doing so. Although many of the specific ques-
tions this new era raises are unprecedented, this Article identi-
fies a number of bodies of law, together with some guiding
principles, to assist the courts tasked with answering them.
272 JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 203 (1987).
273 Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword, Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L.
REv. 31, 39 (2016).
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